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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Real and perceived differences in criminal justice outcomes unrelated to case 
merits were an animating concern underlying the modern sentencing reform movement 
beginning in the 1970s (see, e.g., Frankel, 1972). These included disparities based on the 
defendants’ social status characteristics, as well as idiosyncratic differences between 
judges or courts. 
A group of seminal studies during the early years of the sentencing reform era 
focused on differences relating to social status and white-collar sentencing. At that time 
data from those studies were among the few quantitative sources on prereform sentencing 
practices. These data were powerful and influential, as large sentencing datasets, though 
now commonplace, generally did not exist before the establishment of the sentencing 
commissions collecting them. At least in part because of this, the data have played a role 
in sentencing research more broadly, not merely with respect to white-collar crime. The 
traditional and widespread understanding of sentencing as a two-stage process involving 
distinct placement and length decisions, for example, derives from the early white-collar 
sentencing literature (see Bushway, Johnson, & Slocum, 2007: 166-167 & n.24; Johnson, 
2006: 273-274). 
As with much of the sentencing reform movement, an emphasis on disparities 
characterizes a lot of this early white-collar sentencing research. But while concerns 
regarding race-, ethnicity-, and gender-based disparities have largely dominated most 
general sentencing literature, this early research on white-collar sentencing tended to 
explore differential treatment based on white-collar status (Hagan, Nagel, & Albonetti, 
1980; Wheeler, Weisburd, & Bode, 1982), along with the effect of political scandal (e.g., 
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Watergate) on sentencing outcomes (see Benson & Walker, 1988; Wheeler, Weisburd, & 
Bode, 1982).  
Studies reached conflicting results concerning white-collar status effects (see 
Simpson, 2013). A relatively consistent finding from this research though was that place 
mattered. Sentencing outcomes prior to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines varied for 
white-collar offenders sentenced in different districts across the federal judicial system 
for violating the same laws.  
Compared to race, a patently unwarranted basis for any differences in outcomes, 
differences associated with geography are more nuanced. Where a crime occurs (or a 
court sits) is arguably as irrelevant and arbitrary a basis for differences in case processing 
as is skin color. But reasonable people might disagree, as location-based differences 
among otherwise similarly situated cases arguably reflect legitimately differing priorities, 
values, politics, and resources inherent in systems with high degrees of local control. As 
Ulmer and Johnson (2004: 137) state: 
If the sentence one receives and the grounds for that sentence depend on 
location, then the notions of equal justice that underlie most Western legal 
systems may be undermined. On the other hand, local autonomy and 
decentralized government are also valued features of American democratic 
philosophy, and are certainly central features of American criminal justice 
. . . .  
While local autonomy characterizes much of the criminal justice system, 
geographical variation is ultimately problematic. We do not, generally speaking, devolve 
criminal legislative powers to local authorities. Geographical variation in sentencing 
outcomes has this effect though, and does not provide the benefit of notice through 
positive law. Although geographical variation raises troubling equal justice issues, 
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subsequent white-collar sentencing research has not paid much attention to the role of 
place. 
Pre-Guidelines white-collar sentencing research concerning geographical 
disparities represents a precursor to the appreciation of the importance of and focus on 
macro-level social contexts that has become a major development within contemporary 
sentencing research. Described by a leading sentencing scholar as “perhaps one of the 
most prominent developments in sentencing theory and research” of the early 21st 
century, research on social contexts shows that “local variation permeates many aspects 
of sentencing” (Ulmer, 2012: 13, 14). Although individual case level factors generally 
explain most of the variation in sentencing (e.g., Ulmer & Johnson, 2004: 165-166), 
contextual research “suggests that various elements of the courtroom social context 
matter” (Johnson, 2005: 763). Going beyond the finding that sentencing outcomes vary 
by locale, research on local contexts demonstrates that not only “what kind of sentence 
one gets” but also “the factors that predict why one gets it, in significant part depends on 
where one is sentenced” (Ulmer, 2012: 14 (emphasis omitted)). 
A “burst” of studies on local context occurred in the 2000s (Ulmer, 2012: 13). 
These studies have investigated a wide variety of outcomes, predictors, and crime types 
in different jurisdictions. White-collar sentencing, however, is an area that has received 
less attention from local context researchers.1  
                                                          
1 White-collar crime in general remains relatively less studied and understood compared to many areas 
within the criminological mainstream; Simpson (2013: 310) asserts “white-collar crime may be the least 
understood but most consequential crime type.”  
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General sentencing studies often do not separate white-collar offenders out from 
the far more numerous conventional offenders (and when they do the researchers 
typically focus on the latter). Research suggests that additional factors or concerns not 
present in sentencing of conventional criminals might come into play with white-collar 
sentencing. The special sensitivity hypothesis, for example, posits that white-collar 
defendants’ privileged backgrounds make them especially ill-suited for incarceration. 
Incarceration may be particularly iatrogenic for these offenders, and seen as less 
appropriate. Though this proposition might not be true empirically (see Stadler, Benson, 
& Cullen, 2013), if judges believe it they may sentence accordingly. We should therefore 
exercise caution when assuming that general-sentencing findings necessarily apply fully 
to white-collar sentencing as well (though neither should one automatically assume that 
general-sentencing findings are entirely inapposite). 
The relatively fewer white-collar crimes in official data quickly become 
overshadowed in analyses of large datasets.2 Although obtaining reliable estimates of 
white-collar crime’s incidence and prevalence is even more challenging than is the case 
with conventional crime, we do know that white-collar crime is “extensive” (Simpson, 
2011: 482-485). Estimates vary, partially as a function of how one defines white-collar 
crime (discussed below) and methodology. But a recent survey conducted by the Federal 
Trade Commission (Anderson, 2013) estimates that approximately 25.6 million people 
were victims in approximately 37.8 million incidents of consumer fraud (which is within 
                                                          
2 Low numbers do not necessarily imply infrequency or inconsequentiality. Rather they at least arguably 




the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s white-collar crime definition, see Barnett, n.d. 
[2000]) in the United States in 2011.  
Despite the small volume of white-collar criminals in most datasets, their harms 
are likely disproportionate to their numbers. White-collar crime is costly. Estimates again 
vary, widely, but the total estimated cost of fraud alone—merely one type of white-collar 
crime—runs into the billions. See, e.g., Deevy and Beals, 2013; Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, 1989. White-collar crime also inflicts psychological harms, such as 
depressive episodes and anxiety disorders, (see Deevy, Lucich, & Beals, 2012; Ganzini, 
McFarland, & Bloom, 1990), or feelings of self-blame and complicity, not necessarily 
present in the conventional property crimes into which researchers frequently fold most 
white-collar crime. And unlike most crime types, white-collar crime, and a perceived 
historical leniency towards it (see Apuzzo & Protess, 2015), threatens to undermine 
confidence in the integrity of our economic, legal, and social institutions (see Benson & 
Walker, 1988: 301; Sutherland, 1983 [1949]: 10; cf. Owens, 2012: 161 (“[E]conomic 
contractions that correspond to major scandals in the financial sector are what motivate 
the largest declines in confidence.”)). 
The current study seeks to begin to rejoin the white-collar sentencing and the 
local contexts of sentencing lines of research by analyzing county3 effects in the 
sentencing of those convicted of select white-collar crimes in Maryland’s circuit courts. 
                                                          
3 Maryland’s 24 jurisdictions consist of its 23 counties and the City of Baltimore. Baltimore City, as an 
independent city, has many legal attributes of a county, including its own circuit court and State’s Attorney. 
For convenience, when referring to Maryland this study uses the words jurisdiction and county 
interchangeably, both to include Baltimore City. 
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An existing body of research has demonstrated jurisdictional, i.e. geographical, 
disparities in the application of the (since-repealed) death penalty in Maryland (e.g., 
Paternoster et al., 2003; 2004). The current study assesses whether and how place matters 
in sentencing for one group of crimes in Maryland typically lacking the degree of media 
exposure, political pressures, and ideological overtones4 frequently accompanying the 
intrinsically extreme case of capital crime, which the existing literature has not 
prominently featured, and concerning which many traditional criminological theories 
have little to say. Data limitations, however, preclude a full contextual analysis. The data 
used (described below) contain few of the higher level observations needed for the 
multilevel models typically used in these types of analyses and also suffer from  
relatively few individual observations overall. 
While much of the existing research on white-collar sentencing has examined 
offenders pursued in federal legal settings (e.g., the studies mentioned above; cf. Simpson 
& Yeager, 2015), the current study deliberately relies instead on state sentencing data. 
Nagel and Hagan (1982: 1440) might very well have been correct that in 1982 “the vast 
majority of white-collar cases prosecuted and brought to the sentencing stage proceed 
through the federal district courts,” but they do not cite research or data to support this 
proposition. Given that state and local criminal justice systems are collectively far larger 
                                                          
4 This is, of course, not to suggest that no white-collar crime possesses these qualities. Scandals such as 
those involving manipulation of foreign exchange markets and benchmark interest rates, resulting in guilty 
pleas to felonies by several global banks and billions of dollars in fines, certainly make the news (see Chon, 
2015; Department of Justice, 2015). This study, however, is concerned with more run-of-the-mill white-
collar crimes, which may be individually less harmful but more common.  
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than the federal system (see, e.g., Richman, 2013: 53) the above statement’s accuracy is 
not self-evident, at least in 2015. 
Variation across federal district courts is also arguably less interesting than local 
differences within a state for at least two reasons. Social context research demonstrates 
that local conditions matter for sentencing, but most federal judicial districts are not 
particularly local. Most states, including Maryland, have only one federal district 
covering the entire state. No state has more than four. Even in states with four, the 
relatively large districts likely mask great heterogeneity (cf. Johnson, Ulmer, & Kramer, 
2008: 768). The Southern District of New York, for example, combines Wall Street with 
the South Bronx as part of the same local context. It includes both the highly urban, 
densely populated, majority of the population racial or ethnic minority, wealthy, and 
cosmopolitan New York County (Manhattan) with the far more rural, sparsely populated, 
less wealthy, more politically conservative, and whiter Sullivan County as a single court 
community. State data from different counties will not eliminate this forced combination 
of disparate areas entirely, but almost inherently involve smaller geographical units that 
we can more meaningfully conceptualize as local communities with relevant shared 
social contexts. 
Conflict arises between competing values of equal justice and local control if and 
when similarly situated defendants receive markedly different sentences for no apparent 
reason, other than that they happen to be in different locations operating within the same 
legal regime.5 A second reason geographical variation in the federal system is arguably 
                                                          
5 Generally enacted at the state level, criminal laws are relatively uniform throughout a state. See, e.g., 
Criminal Law Article, Annotated Code of Maryland. The same is true within the federal system, cf. 
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less interesting than within states is that the countervailing interest in local control is less 
salient in the federal criminal justice system. The federal court system, by design, 
features little local control. As Presidential appointees, United States Attorneys and 
federal judges neither represent nor are accountable to local communities. How we 
decide to balance the competing values of equal justice and local control, or otherwise 
resolve their tension, is ultimately a normative issue (and far beyond the scope of this 
study). But normative arguments for local control that might justify geographical 
variation in sentencing outcomes within state courts arguably become far less compelling 
for the federal courts in the face of equal justice concerns. 
We know very little about geographical variation, and even less about local-level 
geographical effects, in white-collar sentencing. Geographical effects in sentencing 
undermine equal justice, and to the extent they differ depending on the type of offenders 
(e.g., white-collar), this raises yet an additional level of concerns. This study addresses 
                                                          
Johnson, Ulmer, and Kramer, 2008: 739 (“Because the federal criminal justice system represents a unified, 
national system, one might expect punishments to be relatively consistent across districts, especially given 
organizational pressures for uniformity.”). Interstate (and state-federal) variation in criminal laws and court 
procedures complicate analysis of jurisdictional variation. Even if perhaps unfair that identical offenders 
might receive very different sentences for identical actions in different states, few would suggest that such 
differences are illegitimate, except where they implicate concerns under the Constitution of the United 
States. But differing definitions, legal requirements, sentencing guidelines formulae, and penalty structures 
– such as statutory maximum and mandatory minimum penalties or the availability of intermediate 
sanctions – across legal systems limit the validity and relevance of comparisons between states, even if one 
assumes their offender populations, courtroom workgroups, and environmental constraints are otherwise 
comparable (itself often a strong assumption). 
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whether and the extent to which the county-level differences previous research finds 
concerning the death penalty in Maryland reflects a wider and more broadly applicable 
phenomenon, as suggested by a broader local contexts of sentencing literature that has yet 
to devote much attention to white-collar crime, or might be related to the unusual 
attributes of death penalty cases. This will increase understanding not only of white-
collar crime, but also of sentencing practices (in Maryland) more broadly.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Social contexts of sentencing research has flourished in the early twenty-first 
century, but the court community perspective laid the initial theoretical groundwork for 
these studies in the late 1970s (see Eisenstein & Jacob, 1977). Eisenstein and Jacob assert 
that court actors “operate in a common task environment, which provides common 
resources and imposes common constraints on their actions” (1977:10). Common goals 
motivate court actors sharing their task environment, who develop relationships 
“cemented by exchanges of inducements” (Eisenstein & Jacob, 1977: 10).  
The nature of the relationships between court actors (collectively the courtroom 
workgroup) shape court outcomes. The court community perspective places particular 
emphasis on the stability and familiarity of relationships in the courtroom workgroup. 
Those relationships are subject to organizational and environmental (the latter including 
other criminal justice actors, the media, and the larger political climate) incentives and 
pressures (see Eisenstein & Jacob, 1977).  
While a formal rationalist (see Savelsberg, 1992) or legal formalist might be 
surprised to learn of geographical effects on sentencing outcomes, the court community 
perspective “predicts significant interjurisdictional variation in sentencing” (Ulmer & 
Johnson, 2004: 140). Where relationships are strong, courtroom workgroups can 
efficiently dispose of their cases and reduce the uncertainty inherent to trials, while 
maintaining group cohesiveness, through plea bargains (Eisenstein & Jacob, 1977). 
Through their relationships courtroom workgroups therefore establish “locally 
distinctive, informal and ever-evolving case processing and sentencing norms, or ‘going 
rates’” (see Ulmer & Johnson, 2004: 140 (citing Eisenstein, Flemming, & Nardulli, 1988; 
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Ulmer, 1997)). Going rates can provide workgroup members with standard terms and 
sentences as a basis for plea bargaining (Ulmer & Johnson, 2004). 
In general, the court community literature predicts that courts in large urban court 
communities will sentence less severely than small courts (see, e.g., Johnson, Ulmer, & 
Kramer, 2008; Ulmer & Johnson, 2004). Larger court communities, the perspective 
asserts, will have more autonomy from outside pressures. Because of the court 
community size, routine cases will receive less public and media scrutiny. Increased 
bureaucratization of sponsoring agencies in larger court communities should also tend to 
increase sentencing leniency (see Johnson, Ulmer, & Kramer, 2008). And the “amount 
and diversity of social deviance in general” purportedly typically being greater in larger 
and more urban areas, greater tolerance and leniency towards deviants results (Ulmer & 
Johnson, 2004: 141).  
Complementary to the court community perspective, the focal concerns 
perspective posits that court actors’ perceptions of a defendant’s blameworthiness, the 
need to protect the community, and practical concerns affect sentencing outcomes (see 
Steffensmeier, Ulmer, & Kramer, 1998). Blameworthiness is a function of the extent of 
the harm caused by and wrongfulness of the defendant’s conduct. Though related, an 
action might be potentially quite harmful without necessarily being especially wrongful, 
such as environmental or regulatory crimes with no culpable mental state required, or 
vice versa, such as embezzling an insubstantial sum. Community protection involves the 
perceived dangerousness of the defendant (i.e., how bad) and risk of reoffending (i.e., 
how likely). Practical constraints incorporates many of the environmental pressures from 
the court community perspective.  
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Focal concerns is in some respects “an extension of the court community 
perspective” (Kramer & Ulmer, 2002: 902). This is because “the meaning, relative 
emphasis and priority, and situational interpretation of [focal concerns] is embedded in 
local court community culture, organizational contexts, and politics” (Kramer & Ulmer, 
2002: 902, 903; see also Johnson, 2006: 291; Ulmer & Johnson, 2004: 141). Authors 
have also used “the focal concerns framework as a heuristic to integrate and organize” the 
“compatible propositions” from multiple related contemporary theoretical sentencing 
perspectives (Johnson, Ulmer, & Kramer, 2008; 745 n.4), none of which appear to be 
“truly competing, mutually exclusive theories of sentencing” (Ulmer, 2012: 8-9 
(emphasis omitted)). 
Contextual research drawing broadly on both the court community and focal 
concerns perspectives has shown that court outcomes vary substantially by local social 
conditions. Ulmer and Johnson (2004) and Johnson (2006) each study both carceral 
placement and length of stay in Pennsylvania state courts using hierarchical linear 
modeling. Among other findings, both studies show that sentencing severity and the 
effects of predictors vary by county (and in Johnson, 2006, also across judges within 
counties). They support the proposition that smaller courts are more likely to impose a 
carceral penalty. Ulmer and Johnson (2004) find that caseload pressure relates negatively 
to placement, while Johnson (2006) additionally finds that the caseload of violent crimes 
influences the effect of a violent crime (the heavier the violent caseload, the less punitive 
judges were towards violent offenders). Ulmer and Johnson (2004) do not find support 
for more severe sentencing in counties with a higher percentage of people voting 
Republican in the 1996 presidential election, and little support for the proposition that 
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minority concentration increases sentencing severity (no support with respect to 
placement). In summary, this research suggests that smaller courts and courts with lower 
caseloads sentence more severely than larger courts with larger caseloads, with at best 
mixed results for the effects of local political and demographic landscapes. 
Social contexts research has also examined sentencing guidelines departures as an 
outcome. As with placement and length, Johnson uses hierarchical linear modeling to 
show that departures from the Pennsylvania sentencing guidelines varied by local 
contexts after taking individual-level factors into account, and that the effects of 
individual-level predictors themselves vary across courts (2005: 780-781). Again 
consistent with the court community perspective, Johnson (2005: 781) finds court size to 
be “a powerful predictor of judicial departures decisions.” Large courts in Pennsylvania 
were more likely and small courts less likely to downwardly depart from the sentencing 
guidelines than medium-sized courts. Large courts were also less likely to upwardly 
depart.  
In addition to court size, Johnson (2005) finds several court and larger 
environmental factors affect departures consistent with the court community and focal 
concerns perspectives. Courts with higher trial rates were more likely to depart upwards, 
while those with more caseload pressure were more likely to depart downwards. Hispanic 
defendants in communities with a higher percentage of Hispanics were less likely to 
receive downward departures and more likely to receive upward departures, but percent 
voting Republican in the 2000 presidential election and percent unemployed had little 
effect. Similar to Johnson (2006), a defendant was more likely to receive a downward 
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departure for a violent crime in communities with a higher violent crime rate (Johnson, 
2005). 
Kramer and Ulmer (2002) also examine departures, though limited to serious 
violent offenders in Pennsylvania. Broadly consistent with Johnson (2005) they find 
downward departures more likely in large urban counties (Kramer & Ulmer, 2002). The 
five counties accounting for half of all the serious violent crime in the data were all more 
likely to depart downwards. The counties (not specifically identified in the study) varied 
widely with respect to their demographic characteristics and violent crime crates, but they 
did cluster geographically, with two medium-sized suburban counties adjacent to a large 
urban county on one side of the state, and a third medium-sized suburban county adjacent 
to the other large urban county on the other side of the state. And four out of the five 
counties had Democratic majorities or pluralities. 
Studying departures in the federal courts, Johnson, Ulmer, and Kramer (2008) 
also find variation in departures and predictors of departures. Unlike studies with state 
data, the authors find court size not to affect the likelihood of receiving a departure, 
which they posit might be due to the size of federal districts (Johnson, Ulmer, & Kramer, 
2008: 768). More politically liberal districts were more likely to grant downward 
departures, as were, similar to the Pennsylvania studies, districts with greater caseload 
pressure. Judges in socioeconomically disadvantaged areas were less likely to grant 
downward departures, particularly to black and Hispanic defendants. 
Collectively, the social context research on departures indicates that smaller state 
courts, but not federal courts, are more severe with respect to departures. Larger, more 
urban courts, and courts with heavier caseloads are more lenient. Larger trial rates and 
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crime rates also make downward departures more likely. This research also shows mixed 
effects for political climate, conditional race and ethnicity effects, and a lower probability 
of a downward departure in socioeconomically disadvantaged areas. 
A related group of studies have examined geographical variation specifically with 
respect to capital punishment. Due to the enhanced procedural safeguards in place in 
capital cases, one might expect great uniformity in the application of the death penalty. 
Research consistently shows, however, that even with the death penalty place matters. 
Poveda (2006), for example, explicitly invokes the court community perspective, as well 
as other theoretical orientations, in a study on death sentences and executions in Virginia. 
Based on descriptive discriminant analysis Poveda suggests Virginia’s smaller and more 
rural jurisdictions with more racial homogeneity and larger proportions of homicides 
involving a prior violent relationship are least likely to be the source of an execution.  
Adger and Weiss (2011) use negative binomial regression to study death 
sentences during the modern era of capital punishment in Alabama. They show that 40% 
of death sentences have come from four of Alabama’s sixty-seven counties. Counties 
with a higher percentage of black lynching victims between 1880 and 1930 and counties 
with more residential segregation were responsible for more death sentences.  
Pierce and Radelet (2005) use logistic regression to estimate the effects of a small 
number of county-level characteristics, victim race and ethnicity characteristics, and the 
presence of aggravating circumstances on death sentencing in California. They show 
counties with a majority non-Hispanic white population and lower population densities 
had higher odds of death sentences in the 1990s. 
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In Illinois between 1988 and 1997, the odds of a death sentence were more than 
80% lower in Cook County than in the 74 rural counties not part of a Metropolitan 
Statistical Area (Pierce and Radelet, 2002). In the five counties bordering Cook County 
and other urban counties (part of a Metropolitan Statistical Area) the odds were more 
than 50% lower than in the rural counties, a marginally significant difference.  
A study primarily concerned with racial disparities within Harris County, Texas, 
notes that Harris County has used capital punishment nearly as much during the modern 
capital punishment era as all other major urban Texan counties combined (Phillips, 2012; 
see also Phillips, 2008). Phillips (2012) notes that Harris County has generated more 
executions than any state (other than Texas), though as the study analyzes within county 
disparity, it does not address why this is the case. Even in Texas though, where support 
for the death penalty is strong (see, e.g., Tuner, 2014), most of the 254 counties have not 
executed anyone (Gershowitz, 2010). 
The current study focuses on Maryland, and geographical variation existed in 
Maryland’s former6 capital sentencing system as well. In a study commissioned by then-
Governor Glendening, Paternoster et al. “examine the role that race and geography may 
play at four critical points in the Maryland capital sentencing system while 
simultaneously considering important features of a case” (2003: 18, see also Paternoster 
et al., 2004). Using a series of logistic regressions Paternoster and colleagues estimate 
racial and geographical effects, after controlling for numerous other case characteristics, 
                                                          
6 Maryland repealed the death penalty in 2013 (2013 Md. Laws Ch. 156 [Senate Bill 276]). The repeal was 
prospective only, but on his last full day in office Governor O’Malley commuted the sentences of 
Maryland’s four remaining death row inmates to life imprisonment (Wagner, 2015). 
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on the judge’s or jury’s decision to sentence a defendant to death, as well as the earlier 
decisions by the prosecutor to file notice to seek a death sentence, not to withdraw that 
notice once filed, and to advance a death-eligible case to a penalty trial following a first-
degree murder conviction (Paternoster et al., 2003: 5). The researchers find “substantial 
variation by legal jurisdiction in the decision to seek a death sentence,” “even after 
controlling for numerous case characteristics” (Paternoster et al., 2003: 29 (emphasis in 
first quote omitted)). 
From an initial pool of approximately six thousand first- and second-degree 
murders between 1978 and 1999,7 the researchers identified 1,311 death-eligible cases. 
Death-eligible cases included any in which a state’s attorney filed notice of intent to seek 
the death penalty regardless of whether the state’s attorney later withdrew that notice. 
The research team also classified cases without a notice of intent to seek death as death-
eligible where the facts of the case (established by reviewing court transcripts, trial judge 
reports, state’s attorney case files, institutional records from the Maryland Division of 
Corrections, and death certificates of victims), showed that the state’s attorney could have 
filed notice. In the approximately three hundred cases where the state’s attorney did not 
file notice and the research team found the facts ambiguous, a panel of both prosecutors 
and defense attorneys with capital experience reviewed case descriptions to determine 
                                                          
7 Following Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), and Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), 
Maryland’s highest court, the Court of Appeals, held Maryland’s death penalty unconstitutional, Blackwell 
v. State, 278 Md. 466, 365 A.2d 545 (1976). In response the General Assembly passed a new guided-
discretion death penalty statute, which took effect in 1978. Governor Glendening commissioned the study 
in 2000. See Paternoster et al., 2003: 4, 7-8, 12. 
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whether a case was death-eligible. The research team added fewer than fifty cases 
following attorney panel review, Paternoster et al., 2003: 15-17. 
Of the (a) 1,311 death-eligible cases, prosecutors filed notice of intent to seek the 
death penalty in (b) 353 cases. Prosecutors eventually withdrew death notices in 140 of 
the 353 cases, leaving (c) 213 cases. Out of the 213 cases in which prosecutors did not 
withdraw notices (d) 180 cases advanced to a penalty trial, with death sentences obtained 
in 76 cases. Missing data reduced these counts to (a) 1,202, (b) 327, (c) 198, and (d) 169 
in the jurisdictional logistic regressions, with less than ten percent missing at each stage. 
With access to more than one hundred covariates, the analyses show that “[i]n the 
Maryland death penalty system, the jurisdiction where the crime occurs and legal 
prosecution begins is clearly one of the most important factors in determining which 
death-eligible defendants are ultimately sentenced to death and which are not” 
(Paternoster et al., 2004: 40-41). Cases in Baltimore County were significantly more 
likely and cases in Baltimore City and Prince George’s County significantly less likely to 
result in a death sentence than others8 (Paternoster et al., 2003: 29).  
By analyzing multiple decision points in the death sentencing system, the 
researchers conclude that the jurisdictional variation in the final decision to impose a 
death sentence was due not to case merits, but rather to “the significantly different rate at 
which prosecutors in the different locations in the state make capital charges and make 
those capital charges ‘stick’ early in the capital punishment process” (Paternoster et al, 
2003: 30). “Although the jurisdictional differences occur early in the process they are 
                                                          
8 The “Other Counties” reference category combined cases from the eighteen Maryland counties other than 
Anne Arundel, Baltimore, Harford, Montgomery, and Prince George’s Counties, and Baltimore City. 
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propagated to later points and go uncorrected” (Paternoster et al, 2003: 31 (emphasis 
omitted)). Because of these case processing differences which “cannot be attributed to the 
kinds of homicides committed” in different counties, “the jurisdiction where the homicide 
occurs matters and matters a great deal” (Paternoster et al., 2003: 31 (emphasis in first 
quote omitted)). 
In a reanalysis of the data from the Maryland death penalty study, Berk, Li, and 
Hickman (2005: 386) similarly conclude that “the location in which a case is brought has 
a very important impact.” Berk, Li, and Hickman (2005) are quite critical of the 
Paternoster et al. (2003) study. They take issue with the statistical approach used and 
inferences drawn by Paternoster and his colleagues, particularly with respect to racial 
effects.9 While Berk, Li, and Hickman’s preferred approaches, using random forests 
modeling and classification and regression trees, find different geographical effects than 
the earlier research, the substantive conclusion that jurisdiction matters is the same. Berk, 
Li, and Hickman call for more research into location, deeming county “just a proxy for 
processes that are not analyzed” (2005: 387), i.e., contextual factors. 
The capital sentencing literature on geographical disparities, as with the general 
social contexts research, suggests that defendants in smaller and more rural jurisdictions 
are more likely to receive the death penalty, though this result is not uniform across all 
studies. Local racial composition and idiosyncratic historical factors also seem to matter 
in some states, but again not consistently in all studies. The Paternoster and colleagues 
                                                          
9 For a reply to Berk, Li, and Hickman (2005) see Paternoster and Brame (2008). Using propensity scores 
the authors reaffirm the basic substantive finding from Paternoster et al. (2003) that black killers of white 
victims fare worse in the death penalty process than other offender-victim racial combinations. 
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research draws attention to the cumulative influence of local prosecutors’ decisions, with 
Baltimore County’s prosecutors particularly punitive, and Baltimore City and Prince 
George’s Counties’ prosecutors particularly lenient. 
White-collar sentencing research has not benefitted greatly from contemporary 
emphases on contextual and geographical effects. Existing literature on (primarily 
federal) white-collar sentencing has largely focused on whether judges sentence white-
collar offenders differently from more conventional criminals, with inconsistent results. 
See, e.g., Benson & Walker, 1988; Hagan, Nagel, & Albonetti, 1980; Nagel & Hagen, 
1982; Wheeler, Weisburd, & Bode, 1982.10 Compared to white-collar or status effects, 
jurisdictional or contextual variation within federal white-collar sentencing across United 
States District Courts has received limited attention from researchers. More than 25 years 
ago Benson and Walker stated “to date, no research has examined the impact of 
contextual variables, such as urbanization and racial mix, on the sentencing of white-
collar offenders” (1988: 301). Unfortunately, research appears to have made little 
progress in this regard since. 
The relative inattention to context and geography in white-collar sentencing 
scholarship is somewhat surprising, inasmuch as white-collar sentencing research 
recognized the importance of place decades ago. Hagan, Nagel, and Albonetti analyze 
sentencing for several thousand white-collar offenders, using an offense-based 
                                                          
10 The original underlying data from this research is also often quite dated (see Simpson, 2013). Much of 
them predate the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which gave rise to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
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definition,11 between 1974 and 1977 in ten districts from large urban areas (1980: 803, 
806-807 & nn. 5 & 6; see also Nagel & Hagan, 1982.) They find that in “District C”12 
prosecutors took a more proactive approach to white-collar crime than in the other 
districts in the study. District C prosecutors brought substantially more white-collar cases 
than prosecutors in other districts.  
Perhaps counterintuitively, white-collar criminals received less severe sentences 
in District C. The researchers interpret this finding as due to prosecutors in District C 
needing to make larger concessions to defendants because of the greater number of cases 
prosecutors brought against college educated defendants—cases presumed to be perhaps 
more complex or large scale and requiring more resources. The researchers speculate that 
general equity concerns might then diffuse these benefits to white-collar crimes 
committed by less educated defendants convicted under the same statutes. They conclude 
that “there may be an inverse relationship between the volume of white-collar convictions 
and the severity of white-collar sentences.” Hagan, Nagel, and Albonetti, 1980: 818-819; 
see also Nagel & Hagan 1982: 1455 (“Preferential sentencing appears to be the price paid 
for expanded prosecution of white-collar crime.”). 
                                                          
11 Defining white-collar crime is an ongoing and contentious issue. Definitions generally either focus on 
characteristics of the offense or characteristics of the offender, with implications for sample composition 
and results. This study’s definition combines elements of both. Chapter 3 discusses differing definitions of 
white-collar crime and the rationale for this study’s definition in greater detail. 
12 Although they identify the districts the study involved, the researchers’ data sharing agreement with the 




Contemporaneous with Hagan, Nagel, and Albonetti (1980), the venerable Yale 
Studies on White-Collar Crime also find variation in federal white-collar sentencing, 
again using an offense-based definition, across seven District Courts (six of which 
overlap with Hagan, Nagel, and Albonetti, 1980), see Wheeler, Weisburd, and Bode, 
1982. Wheeler and his colleagues also examine whether judges sentence white-collar 
offenders more leniently than conventional criminals, reaching very different conclusions 
from Hagan and his colleagues. Wheeler and his colleagues include dummy variables for 
the district of conviction as “other variables,” in their models.  
The researchers find the district “important and highly significant” in the judge’s 
decision whether to incarcerate, even “more powerful in its effects on length of 
sentence,” and that the effect of defendant’s sex on the incarceration decision varies by 
location (Wheeler, Weisburd, and Bode, 1982: 652, 655). In addition to the explanation 
offered by Hagan, Nagel, and Albonetti (1980), Wheeler, Weisburd, and Bode suggest 
that the differences may represent variation in local norms (1982: 652). The authors do 
not seem to find jurisdictional effects troubling, although elsewhere Weisburd, Wheeler, 
Waring, and Bode (1991) suggest that jurisdictional variation reflects a so-called chaos 
perspective.13 
                                                          
13 Weisburd et al. (1991) contrast three perspectives (alternately termed models) of sentencing. The “model 
of chaos and disarray” posits “judges respond to their own biases and moods, which will vary from judge to 
judge. The only consistency in sanctioning is the inconsistency of judicial behavior. Punishments will seem 
arbitrary and bear little relationship to the crime committed” (Weisburd et al., 1991: 132-133). They 
contrast this with a model of pervasive discrimination and their preferred model based on “common 
sociolegal norms” rooted in Anglo-American principles of seriousness and blameworthiness, both 
principles “part of a broader set of normative judgments widely diffused throughout society,” as well as 
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More recent white-collar sentencing studies have not considered geographical 
variation to the same extent as the above research. Studies often do not include location 
in their analyses, see, e.g., Albonetti, 1998a; Eitle, 2000. Others have included measures 
of geography as control variables, rather than independent variables of substantive 
interest (with the effect of “controlling for jurisdictional variation rather than [] 
investigating” it, Johnson, Ulmer, & Kramer, 2008: 741), and omitted them from results 
reported and discussion, see, e.g., Schanzenbach and Yaeger, 2006; Van Slyke and Bales, 
2012. In a study of gender effects on federal white-collar sentencing Albonetti (1998b: 
37) also “control[s] for circuit-specific sentencing practices” with dummy variables, 
consigning most of the circuit results to the appendix without substantive discussion. 
The only fairly recent published study of geographical variation in white-collar 
sentencing concerns regional differences in federal sentencing related to the savings and 
loan crisis (Jennings & Miller, 2006). Rather than grouping states according to the 
geographical boundaries of the United States Courts of Appeals, the authors group states 
into six purported regions, ostensibly based on similar “climate, geography, traditions, 
culture, and similar divisions in the federal district courts” (Jennings & Miller, 2006: 91). 
Jennings and Miller use ordinary least squares regression to estimate the effects of region 
and organizational position on sentence length. The authors find their Southwest region 
“uniquely more punitive in its handling of white-collar criminals” (Jennings & Miller, 
                                                          
consequences, such as deterrent effects (Weisburd et al., 1991: 133). “[I]f chaos reigns,” they assert, “we 
should have grave difficulty in predicting sentences at all” (Weisburd et al., 1991: 137).  
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2006: 96). Their Southwest region (Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas, 
spreading across three different Circuits) was both the modal region and most punitive.14  
While geographical variation has not featured prominently in recent white-collar 
sentencing research, white-collar crime has also been all but absent from research on 
local contexts and sentencing, cf. Ulmer, 2012. Ulmer and his colleagues do use “white 
collar/fraud” as a reference category in a study of district variation in trial penalties, but 
they are not entirely clear on what this includes (compare Ulmer, Eisenstein, and 
Johnson, 2010: 570, with 576-577). And a recent study of the effect of offender 
educational attainment on sentencing, purporting to contribute to contextual research, 
includes white-collar as one of a series of offense-type dummy control variables, but the 
author provides no indication of what he considers white-collar crime and does not 
specifically discuss the white-collar offenses (Franklin, 2015). 
Existing white-collar sentencing literature therefore provides little guidance on 
geographical effects. Prioritizing white-collar cases prior to the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines seems to have been related to sentencing leniency. But the implications of this 
finding for white-collar sentencing in state court under a guidelines system are not 
obvious.  
                                                          
14 The authors offer three “speculations” (Jennings & Miller, 2006: 97) for the Southwest’s punitiveness. 
They suggest that the Southwest may have been more punitive because Texas had the largest concentration 
of thrift insolvencies; Texas was in a severe recession during the time period under examination; and 
Texas’s, and the other Southwestern states,’ laissez-faire business orientation brought on a “heavy-handed 
response” from the federal government responding “corrupt and unsavory business practices,” and seeking 
to make an example of the situation (Jennings & Miller, 2006: 97). 
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The current inquiry’s goal is to establish whether and how court outcomes for 
white-collar criminals in Maryland differ based on where the case transpires, “after 
controlling for numerous case characteristics” (cf. Paternoster et al., 2003: 29 (emphasis 
omitted)). Focal concerns predicts local court communities distinctively interpreting, 
prioritizing, and emphasizing the ideas of blameworthiness, community protection, and 
practical concerns in the context of their courtroom workgroups. The existing literature 
shows that local contexts affect a variety of case outcomes for a variety of crime types, in 
both state and federal courts. Whether a violent criminal goes to jail or not, whether a 
racial or ethnic minority defendant receives a sentencing departure or not, and whether a 
murderer receives the death penalty or not, all appear to turn partially on the seemingly 
innocuous matter of court location. White-collar defendants, however, represent a gap in 
this literature. The gap is particularly large in the state courts handling the bulk of routine 
criminal prosecutions. 
This study addresses that gap. The most consistent finding from the literatures 
summarized above is that courts in larger, more urban, more politically liberal 
communities tend to sentence more leniently in terms of placement, length, or departures 
than smaller, more rural, politically conservative court communities. For white-collar 
crime, however, this plausibly might not be the case. Business-related white-collar crimes 
might be a more salient concern, and perceived as posing more of the threat to the 
community in larger and more urban court communities. Smaller and more politically 
conservative communities might be more skeptical of nontraditional or business-related 
economic crimes, and perceive offenders as less blameworthy. White-collar criminals 
also include many organizational offenders, which might also alter typical patterns.  
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One might therefore expect, and this study predicts, geographical results for 
white-collar sentencing that differ from general offender findings. I expect that outcomes 
will vary by jurisdiction, and that larger court communities will sentence more severely, 
and smaller courts more leniently, than we would usually anticipate. Given the inchoate 
state of the literature on geographical differences in white-collar sentencing, limitations 
of the data, and the current study’s essentially exploratory nature,15 this study does not, 
however, attempt to test which county-level factors predict variation in white-collar 
sentencing. 
Simpson’s warning that “many traditional criminological theories may be 
irrelevant” (2013: 318) with respect to white-collar crime concerns theories of offending. 
But to the extent sentencing reflects why and how judges believe people offend or 
experience punishment, we should exercise caution in applying general sentencing 
research and theory in the white-collar sentencing context as well. The mere existence of 
the special sensitivity hypothesis, for example, whether or not it is empirically accurate 
(see Stadler, Benson, & Cullen, 2013), suggests considerations in white-collar sentencing 
may differ from conventional crimes. Whether we observe geographical effects in 
Maryland’s white-collar sentencing, similar to those under its former capital sentencing 
system and contextual research more broadly, is therefore a threshold question with 
                                                          
15 Babbie (2013) characterizes as exploratory research intended to familiarize the researcher in a relatively 
new subject of inquiry. Among other things exploratory research may yield “approximate answers,” point 




respect to how processing theories explaining sentencing of conventional crime apply to 
the white-collar area.  
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CHAPTER 3: DATA 
This chapter begins by describing the Maryland Sentencing Guidelines Database 
(the “Database”), the source of the data used in this study. It then discusses how this 
study operationalizes white-collar crime from the Database extract. The chapter then 
describes the variables that the data analyses use. 
a. The Maryland Sentencing Guidelines Database 
The Maryland State Commission on Criminal Justice Policy (the “Commission” 
or “MSCCSP”) oversees Maryland’s voluntary sentencing guidelines and monitors 
Maryland circuit court sentencing practices.16 Towards that end the Commission collects 
sentencing guidelines worksheets from cases sentenced in circuit courts. Information 
from the worksheets forms the basis for the Database. The data this study uses are an 
extract of the Database. 
In addition to the sentencing guidelines worksheets, the Maryland Judiciary is a 
second supplemental data source for the Database and this study. The person calculating 
sentencing guidelines typically fills the sentencing guidelines worksheet out by hand, 
though the Commission and local jurisdictions are in the process of automating 
                                                          
16 Circuit courts are the “trial courts of general jurisdiction” in Maryland (Maryland Judiciary, 2015), 
unlike the Courts of Appeals for the 13 federal circuits, which exercise appellate jurisdiction over the 
United States District Courts. Slightly muddling matters, Maryland’s circuit courts also hear appeals from 
the District Court of Maryland, and the latter has concurrent jurisdiction over some criminal cases, although 
circuit courts “generally handle the . . . more serious criminal matters” (Maryland Judiciary, 2015). 
Maryland’s sentencing guidelines only apply in circuit courts. The Database therefore only reflects cases 
sentenced in circuit courts. 
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guidelines calculation and worksheet submission. As a result of this manual process, 
worksheet entries are occasionally incomplete or ambiguous, sometimes for no other 
reason than difficult handwriting or someone not pressing hard enough with a pen for 
writing to transfer across copies. When information on a worksheet is missing or unclear 
the Commission augments the data from the worksheets with the Maryland Judiciary 
Case Search website (http://casesearch.courts.state.md.us/). This website allows anyone, 
searching by name or case number, to retrieve a wealth of information on individual 
cases.  
The Database extract includes people sentenced in a Maryland circuit court 
between January 01, 1999, and June 30, 2014, for whom Commission received 
sentencing information.17 The full dataset includes approximately 180,000 sentencing 
events, in which a judge sentenced a defendant for one or more crimes. A sentencing 
event may involve multiple charges, so the approximately 180,000 sentencing events 
include over 240,000 offenses. Defendants who recidivated within the fifteen years 
covered, if sentenced in a circuit court for the new offense(s), will appear in the data 
more than once. Since 2007 sentencing guideline worksheets have collected State 
                                                          
17 Although essentially all incarcerable violations of Maryland state law originally prosecuted in circuit 
court are subject to the sentencing guidelines and require a sentencing guidelines worksheet (see MSCCSP, 
2015b), compliance with this requirement is not universal. In 2014 the Commission and Judicial 
Information Systems (a division of the Maryland Judiciary’s Administrative Office of the Courts) 
developed an indicator in the courts’ case management system to identify guidelines-eligible cases 
requiring a worksheet (MSCCSP, 2015a: 12). The number of cases from prior years which should have had 
a sentencing guidelines worksheet prepared but did not is unknown. 
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Identification Numbers, which should permit one to identify a defendant appearing 
subsequent times in the Database, but in practice this field is frequently missing. 
This study focuses on data from a small subset of cases with defendants sentenced 
only for a single count that was a white-collar crime (operationally defined below) or 
where the white-collar offense was the controlling (i.e., the most serious) offense18 
(n=381), also spanning from 1999 to 2014. As in other court systems, most people 
sentenced in Maryland circuit courts receive sentences for conventional crimes. 
Comparisons in sentencing between white-collar and conventional criminals have 
generated a substantial literature, but this being a study on geographical variation in 
white-collar sentencing, comparing sentences of more common crimes has little 
relevance, and the primary analyses only consider the white-collar defendants.19 
The Database and Case Search have several notable limitations. Other than 
indicating the circuit court that sentenced the defendant neither source contains court- or 
county-level information, such as court caseloads or county population characteristics. 
The Database does not identify sentencing judges (Case Search rarely does so) or 
prosecutors, or include their characteristics. The Database also does not include 
predisposition outcomes, such as charge reductions or pretrial release. Because the 
                                                          
18 For one defendant sentenced for two identical white-collar counts with each labeled controlling I recoded 
one count to not controlling to avoid having the sentencing event appear twice in the data. 
19 Insofar as the volume of (predominantly nonwhite-collar) cases sentenced reflects court size or caseload 
pressures, court context factors such as these likely affect sentencing outcomes for all defendants. Although 
potentially a topic for future research, contextual or multilevel analysis incorporating court-level variables 
would be beyond the scope of the present inquiry. 
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Commission removes defendant names before issuing the data to requesters, Case Search 
is not be available if the case number is missing. And not all cases are retrievable on Case 
Search.  
b. White-Collar Crime in the Maryland Sentencing Guidelines Database. 
No universally agreed-upon definition of white-collar crime exists. The term does 
not, generally speaking, refer to a specific statutorily enumerated offense or class of 
offenses. See, e.g., Podgor, 2007: 24. But see 42 U.S.C. § 3791(a)(18) (defining white-
collar crime for purposes of Chapter 46 of Title 42 of the United States Code); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3722(c)(2)(F) (the sole section using § 3791’s definition of white-collar crime, and the 
only section in the entire United States Code other than § 3971 using the term, 
authorizing the National Institute of Justice to conduct or authorize research and 
development concerning white-collar crime). As a result competing definitions abound, 
cf. Green, 2004, along with much debate, which has been “a distraction to moving the 
field forward” (Simpson, 2013: 313).  
Broadly speaking, despite lack of consensus, white-collar crime definitions 
typically fall within one of two intellectual and research traditions. Sutherland (1940) 
first articulated the concept and identified the problem of white-collar crime. Sutherland 
offers an offender-based understanding of white-collar crime, defining it “approximately 
as a crime committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of 
his occupation” (Sutherland, 1983 [1949]: 7). A competing tradition, following Edelhertz 
(1970), has used offense-based definitions. Considering Sutherland’s approach too 
narrow, Edelhertz defines white-collar crime as “an illegal act or series of illegal acts 
committed by nonphysical means and by concealment or guile, to obtain money or 
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property, to avoid the payment or loss of money or property, or to obtain business or 
personal advantage” (1970: 3). 
Definitional disagreements frequently coalesce along disciplinary lines. Literature 
favoring Sutherland’s offender-based definition and its progeny has typically come from 
social scientists. E.g., Simpson, 2013. Law enforcement agencies and lawyers, on the 
other hand, have tended towards offense-based definitions descended from Edelhertz. 
See, e.g., Barnett, n.d. [2000]; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1989; see also Green, 
2004.20 Legal actors and scholars are hardly the only people to rely on offense-based 
definitions though, see, e.g., Stadler, Benson, and Cullen, 2013, if for no other reason 
than because most administrative or other readily accessible existing datasets typically 
lack good measures, or sometimes any measures, of social status, actions taken in the 
course of one’s occupation, or both. 
The choice of how one defines white-collar crime is not trivial. As Simpson 
(2013: 312) explains “research that adopts one approach over the other tends to generate 
a different portrait of the white-collar offender.” An offense-based definition will, for 
example, likely result in predominantly middle class offenders, with unusually large 
numbers, in relative terms, of females. See Simpson, 2013; Weisburd, Waring, and 
Chayet, 2001.  
A status-neutral definition might possess certain prima facie appeal on fairness 
grounds, see, e.g., Podgor, 2007: 737, based on the idea that we generally define crimes 
based on the act and not the actor. An offense-based sample may, however, bear little 
                                                          
20 Offender- and offense-based definitions are not mutually exclusive options. The Bureau of Justice 
Statistics (1982), for example, has defined white-collar crime by drawing on both perspectives.  
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resemblance to the particular problem of the modern robber barons with whom 
Sutherland was concerned (1983 [1949]: 7-8). Offender-based conceptualizations also 
likely have greater resonance with and are closer to the construct of white-collar crime as 
understood by the general public (cf. Simpson and Yeager, 2015: 46), especially in the 
wake of the global financial crisis and recent (if unrelated) sensational cases. 
Using sentencing data in research tends to widen the gap between offense- and 
offender-based definitions. Although, for example, Sutherland’s “approximate[]” 
definition refers only to “crime,” Sutherland’s idea of white-collar crime deliberately 
embraces civil and regulatory offenses (1983 [1949]: 6-7). Sutherland suggests that 
people with respectability and high social status avoid criminal sanctions in part due to 
influence over the criminal law itself, rather than meaningfully different behavior or 
harm. 
The underlying illegal behavior in civil or regulatory proceedings can be 
indistinguishable from crime. That behavior is frequently subject to any of criminal, civil, 
and administrative penalties. Holder (2012), for example, notes “[t]he potential for 
parallel proceedings arises in many of the Department [of Justice]'s white collar 
enforcement priorities, and it is essential that an effective and successful response involve 
an evaluation of criminal, civil, regulatory, and administrative remedies. Crooks et al. 
(2014: 1054) similarly state “[m]ost of the [nine principal environmental] statutes . . . 
contain overlapping civil, criminal, and administrative penalty provisions.”  
The language in Edelhertz’s (1970) definition of white-collar crime similarly does 
not preclude noncriminal violations of law. But sentencing datasets, and other 
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administrative and official data, typically do not include information on civil21 or 
regulatory proceedings, effectively limiting much sentencing research to criminal-
offense-based definitions of white-collar crime. Doing so omits much of the theoretically 
critical behavior contemplated by Sutherland’s (and other) offender-based definitions. 
And even if sentencing datasets were to include civil judgments or administrative 
penalties, an offender-based understanding of white-collar crime would likely expect that 
data limited to offenders pleading or found guilty, or reaching analogous noncriminal 
dispositions, will systematically select out white-collar offenders, who presumably have 
access to better (or simply more) legal resources. This is not inherently a problem for 
offense-based definitions, but will result in a very different offender profile. 
This study attempts to address white-collar crimes that are consistent with 
Sutherland’s definition. Offender-based definitions of white-collar crime have greater 
construct validity than offense-based definitions; Edelhertz’s definition, for example 
includes such crimes as welfare fraud as white-collar crime, which seems dubious. As 
with many sentencing datasets (see, e.g., Kramer & Ulmer, 2002: 908), however, the 
Database does not have a good measure of high social status. Type of defense attorney is 
the only available proxy, albeit crude, available for high social status.22 The Database 
                                                          
21 The Federal Justice Statistics Program, which includes civil case files from the Executive Office for 
United States Attorneys and the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, is a notable exception. 
The civil case series is relatively recent, and while certainly an advance and promising is still developing 
and has several limitations. See Simpson and Yeager, 2015. 
22 The Database has a separate measure of low social status, relating to whether the court waived imposing 
$45 in court costs upon finding that the defendant is unlikely to be able to pay any significant part of the 
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also does not have a direct measure of crimes committed in the course of one’s 
occupation.  
Due to these limitations, for this study I reviewed the list of crimes present within 
the Database extract and selected four types of offenses that facially seem most consistent 
with Sutherland’s offender-based definition. These are crimes that by their nature appear, 
admittedly only intuitively, to be more likely to have occurred in the course of the 
defendant’s occupation, and can include crimes committed by business entities. And 
these offenses also seem almost to require the defendant to have, if not a high social 
status, at least a higher social status than is generally the case in a sample of criminally 
sentenced people.23 
                                                          
costs within the following twelve years. Aside from indicating low, rather than high, social status, this field 
is missing more than two thirds of the time, effectively eliminating any potential usefulness. 
23 Though by no means a test, the proportion of defendants with a private defense attorney was far higher 
for those convicted of crimes designated below as white-collar crimes than among defendants overall in the 
Database extract. Approximately one third of defendants whose controlling (or sole) conviction count was 
not a white-collar crime had a private defense attorney, whereas a more than 50% larger share of 
defendants whose controlling (or sole) conviction count was white collar had a private defense attorney 
(approximately 54%). Similarly the proportion of defendants represented by the Office of the Public 
Defender was more than 50% larger for defendants whose controlling (or sole) conviction count was not a 
white-collar crime than for defendants whose controlling (or sole) conviction count was white-collar 
(approximately 43% vs. approximately 27%). These percentages are prior to data cleaning, so that the 
percentages for white-collar and conventional cases are comparable. In the main analyses below, limited to 




The Commission has categorized a group of offenses as “Commercial Fraud, 
Other” (there is no general “Commercial Fraud” category). These offenses are COMAR# 
80 to 98-4 in the Guidelines Offense Table appended to the Maryland Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual (MSCCSP, 2015b; see also Md. Code Regs. [COMAR] 14.22.02.02), 
though offenses listed in the Guidelines Offense Table are not necessarily all present in 
the data.24 Crimes in this category include false statements with the intent to deceive a 
person authorized to examine the affairs of the bank (COMAR# 80), willful failure to 
obtain and maintain a corporate surety bond or to hold sums of money in an escrow 
account (COMAR# 84), and pyramid schemes (COMAR# 95), among various other 
frauds.  
The Commission has also categorized a group of actions as violations of 
“Consumer Protection Laws” (COMAR# 99), for violating provisions of the Credit Card 
Number Protection Act. This crime involves the unauthorized use or disclosure of a credit 
card number, other payment device or the holder’s signature (Criminal Law Article, 
§ 8-214). The provision “aim[s] at persons who came into possession of a credit card 
number(s) with a fraudulent intent or who came into possession of the number(s) 
lawfully, but thereafter formed a fraudulent intent.” Clark v. State, 188 Md. App. 185, 
199-200, 981 A.2d 710 (2009). Simply stealing a credit card and using it does not violate 
this section. Id.  
                                                          
24 Appendix I is an excerpt of the Offense Table detailing the offenses in the Database extract that this 




The Commission’s “Public Health and Safety, Crimes Against” heading contains, 
among other things, several environmental crimes (COMAR# 331 to 338-1). I have 
included as white-collar crimes those environmental offenses that appear to be pursuing 
violations in the course of an occupation or a business. These include unlawfully 
dumping for commercial purposes (any amount) or of more than five hundred pounds or 
two hundred sixteen cubic feet of litter (COMAR# 333) and failing to meet the regulatory 
requirements for generators (COMAR # 334). Within this heading, however, I have 
excluded improperly disposing of more than 100 but less than five hundred pounds or 
more than 27 but less than 216 cubic feet of litter not for commercial gain (COMAR# 
338) as too general to be plausibly targeting violations in the course of an occupation or a 
business.  
Lastly, the Commission’s “Theft, Crimes Involving” heading contains several 
general theft offenses, but also the more specific embezzlement by fiduciaries (COMAR# 
387). This study categorizes the latter as white-collar crime. Under Maryland law, this 
crime involves a fiduciary’s appropriation of entrusted money or property for some use 
other than intended. See State v. Burroughs, 333 Md. 614, 622, 636 A.2d 1009 (1994). A 
fiduciary is one transacting business or handling money or property for the benefit of 
another person, where the two have a relationship “implying and necessitating great 
confidence and trust” in one and “a high degree of good faith” from the other. Schwartz v. 
State, 103 Md. App. 378, 386, 653 A.2d 958 (1995) (internal citations omitted). As one 
example, by no means necessarily representative, the president of a savings and loan is a 




I suffer from no misconception that all offenders sentenced for the above crimes 
would satisfy a purely offender-based definition (nor that no defendants sentenced for 
crimes in excluded categories would fit Sutherland’s definition). Someone can certainly 
commit insurance fraud or illegally disclose a credit card number, for example, outside 
the scope of an occupation and without being high status. The data also almost certainly 
include those involved in illicit businesses, deviating from Sutherland’s emphasis on 
activity related to legitimate business entities. Within the limitations of the data, however, 
the selected offenses are the best available option. They likely select an offender pool that 
on average has higher social status than in the Database extract more broadly (though in 
these data that is an untestable assumption) and at least avoid crimes such as public 
benefits frauds (e.g., COMAR# 326, 327), which fit within Edelhertz’s offense-based 
definition but seem a far cry from what Sutherland or the general public would 
realistically view as white-collar crime.25 
Limiting this study to and defining white-collar crime as convictions for one of 
four types of offenses introduces biases. As with other studies limited to criminally 
convicted defendants selection is likely. More skillful offenders, or more skillfully 
                                                          
25 The Commission (2015b: 5; see also Md. Code Regs. [COMAR] 14.22.01.02B(22)) has defined “white 
collar offense,” for purposes of the Maryland sentencing guidelines in terms nearly identical to Edelhertz 
(1970). Other than in defining the term, the only use of white collar offense in the Maryland sentencing 
guidelines is as one of nine common reasons for upward departures from the recommended sentencing 
range (see MSCCSP, 2015b: 59; Md. Code Regs. [COMAR] 14.22.01.05C(5)). Upward departures are 
uncommon, and in cases with upward departures the reason field is frequently blank (see, e.g., MSCCSP, 
2015a: 41, 48). Judges have used the white collar offense departure code at only eighty-nine sentencing 
events, mostly with defendants convicted under general theft provisions. 
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represented offenders, are less likely to appear among the convicted. White-collar 
offenders, particularly elite offenders and business entities, may successfully have their 
matters diverted to civil or administrative proceedings that are simply unavailable for 
conventional criminals. Despite selecting offenses believed to be most consistent with 
Sutherland’s offender-based definition, the presumable inclusion of offenders not 
possessing respectability or high social status, or not committing their crimes in the 
course of legitimate occupations, will limit the relevance of any geographical effects 
detected beyond the selected crimes. One must therefore exercise caution regarding 
generalizability to offenders convicted of other arguably white-collar offenses, 
nonconvicted offenders, or offender-based conceptions of white-collar crime more 
generally. 
c. Geographical Variables 
Because this is a study of local effects on sentencing, the main independent 
variable of interest is the location of sentence. Dummy variables indicate county. The 
analyses consider five counties with at least thirty white-collar observations individually: 
Anne Arundel County (n=97, 25.46%), Montgomery County (n=70, 18.37%), Baltimore 
County (n=51, 13.39%), Baltimore City (n=50, 13.12%), and Prince George’s County 
(n=30, 8.40%).  
Due to smaller numbers of observations, I group the remaining counties for the 
analyses. The groups derive from the regions used in the Maryland Uniform Crime 
Reporting Program (see Maryland Department of State Police, 2014). They also largely 
correspond to the regions in the Maryland Statistical Handbook (see Maryland 
Department of Planning, 2015). Table 1a shows the distribution of counties and regions 
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by white-collar offense type in the Database extract, Table 1b shows the distribution of 
counties and regions by outcome, and Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for all variables 
used.  
[Table 1 and 2 about here.] 
Though the counties in each region are by no means identical, they tend to share 
various similarities. The court community and focal concerns literatures emphasize court 
community size, likely the most consistently important characteristic related to variation 
in outcomes. A common way to measure court size has been with respect to the number 
of judgeships in a jurisdiction, which are generally similar within the regions. The 
number of judges in a jurisdiction is related to other community attributes with some, 
though less consistent, support in existing research, that also tend to be similar within 
regions. Larger, more urban, and more densely populated counties, which are also often 
more heavily Democratic with a higher percentage minority population, tend to have 
more judgeships, as do jurisdictions (often disadvantaged) with more violent crime. 
The Maryland UCR Program’s Region I - Eastern Shore (n=21, 5.51%), includes 
Cecil, Dorchester, Queen Anne’s, Somerset, Talbot, and Wicomico Counties (see 
Maryland Department of State Police, 2014).26 These are small court communities. The 
circuit courts for four of these six counties have only one judgeship each, though two 
courts each have four judgeships (Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, § 1-503.). Not 
                                                          
26 Region I also includes Caroline, Kent, and Worcester Counties, but these had no cases in which the 
controlling or sole conviction offense was a white-collar crime. They therefore do not appear in the 
analyses. The Maryland Statistical Handbook splits the Eastern Shore into separate Upper Eastern Shore 
and Lower Eastern Shore Regions (see Maryland Department of Planning, 2015). 
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surprisingly, the counties in this region have relatively small populations (four had less 
than 50,000 people in 2014, the others around 100,000 people) and low population 
densities (the four smallest, and six of the seven smallest of counties in the white-collar 
data). These are largely rural areas, several with fairly high 2013 poverty rates, and 2013 
median household incomes mostly lower than the state median. The 2013 violent crime 
rate for these counties ranges between 1.9 and 5.0 per 1,000 people, which is similar to 
most other counties, though with wider a range (the Eastern Shore includes at least twice 
as many counties as the other regions, so the wider ranger is not surprising). (See 
Maryland Department of Planning, 2012; 2015). While neither major political party 
systematically dominates voter registration among these counties, about 64% to 79% 
voted for Larry Hogan (R) in the 2014 gubernatorial election, compared to about 51% 
statewide (see Maryland State Board of Elections, 2014a; 2014b).  
Region II - Southern Maryland (n=26, 6.82%) in the Maryland UCR Program 
includes Calvert, Charles, and Saint Mary’s Counties (see Maryland Department of State 
Police, 2014). They generally comprise slightly larger court communities, with three or 
four judgeships per county circuit court (Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, 
§ 1-503). These counties are generally more populated (about 90,000 to 150,000 people 
in 2014), and more densely populated, than the Eastern Shore Counties. Though still 
largely rural the Southern Maryland counties are more urban than most of the Eastern 
Shore, with generally less poverty and higher household incomes (all three are above the 
2013 state median), and their violent crime rates ranged from 1.2 to 3.8 per 1,000 in 
2013. (See Maryland Department of Planning, 2012; 2015). In Calvert and Saint Mary’s 
Counties, with roughly equal numbers of registered Democrats and Republicans, Hogan 
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received about 69% and 73% of the 2014 vote (respectively), though in Charles County, 
where Democrats outnumber Republicans nearly two and a half to one, Anthony Brown 
received a majority (52%) (Maryland State Board of Elections, 2014a; 2014b). 
The Maryland UCR Program’s Region III - Western Maryland (n=19, 4.99%) 
includes Allegany, Frederick, and Washington Counties (see Maryland Department of 
State Police, 2014).27 Frederick and Washington Counties have slightly still larger court 
communities, with five judgeships each, while Allegany County has two, i.e., more than 
most of the Eastern Shore but less than any of the Southern Maryland counties (Courts 
and Judicial Proceedings Article, § 1-503). Allegany County’s 2014 population was 
greater than four of the six Eastern Shore counties, but less than the Southern Maryland 
counties, while Frederick and Washington Counties had similar (Washington) and higher 
(Frederick) populations than the Southern Maryland Counties in 2014, and roughly 
comparable population densities. Allegany County is very rural, while Frederick and 
Washington Counties had urban levels similar to two of the three Southern Maryland 
counties. Allegany and Washington Counties had 2013 poverty rates above the statewide 
level (though Washington is within the statewide margin of error), and median household 
incomes below. The 2013 violent crime rate ranged between 2.5 and 3.4 for these 
counties. (See Maryland Department of Planning, 2012, 2015). Republicans outnumber 
                                                          
27 Region III also include Carroll and Garrett counties, but these had no cases in which the controlling or 
sole conviction was a white-collar crime, and they therefore do not appear in the analyses. The Maryland 
Statistical Handbook does not include Frederick County (or Carroll County) in its Western Maryland 
Region (see Maryland Department of Planning, 2015). 
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Democrats by 10% to 30%, and Hogan received 63% to 75% of the gubernatorial vote in 
the Western Maryland counties (Maryland State Board of Elections, 2014a; 2014b).  
This study analyzes the Maryland UCR Program’s two Washington Metropolitan 
(Region IV) counties (Montgomery and Prince George’s Counties) (see Maryland 
Department of State Police, 2014) individually, as well as three of the five Baltimore 
Metropolitan (Region V) counties (Anne Arundel and Baltimore Counties, and Baltimore 
City). This study combines the remaining two Baltimore Metropolitan region counties 
(Harford and Howard) as Other Counties (n=15, 3.94%).  
Harford and Howard Counties each have five judgeships, the same as Frederick 
and Washington Counties, and more than the other grouped counties, but fewer than the 
individual counties (see Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, § 1-503). They have 
larger populations, more densely arranged, than the counties in the other three regions 
(though fewer and less densely populated than in the individually considered counties). 
Harford and Howard are both more urban than the other grouped counties (though 
Howard is nearly twice as urban as Harford), and their 2013 violent crime rates were 2.7 
and 2.1 per 1,000, respectively. Both had 2013 poverty rates below the statewide level 
and 2013 median household incomes above it. (See Maryland Department of Planning, 
2012; 2015).  
d. Dependent Variables. 
This study models three outcomes captured by the Database—(1) placement, with 
two measures for this outcome; (2) departures below the guidelines recommended 
sentencing range; and (3) disposition type (ABA pleas, defined below). As previously 
noted the Database does not include predisposition outcomes, such as charge reductions 
44 
 
or pretrial release. While it includes sentence length this field is highly skewed. More 
than 60% of white-collar defendants received no incarceration (a plurality of the 
remainder received one month or less). This study thus does not model sentence length.  
As described above a variety of court community features predict placement, a 
common indication of sentence severity. The placement decision being binary, this study 





where x is a vector of explanatory variables, and 𝛽𝛽 the logit coefficients. This study 
models two measures of the placement outcome separately—any incarceration and 
postsentencing incarceration. Approximately 30% (n=115) of the defendants received a 
jail or prison term after their sentencing. Also including those held before sentencing, 
such as on bail, increases this number by 21% (n=139, 36.48%).28  
The existing literature shows that court community features also affect departures, 
an additional indication of severity. Though judges mostly sentenced white-collar 
defendants in these data within the recommended guidelines range (n=281, 73.75%), a 
substantial minority received sentences below the recommended sentencing guidelines 
range (n=69, 18.11%). A smaller proportion received sentences above the recommended 
                                                          
28 Coding a defendant who the judge sentences to one month incarceration, but who was held on bail for a 
month (or more) during the pendency of the case as not receiving any carceral penalty would improperly 
equate such a defendant with one held on bail for a month, and then sentenced to probation only. The 139 
referred to above should include only the former.  
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guidelines range (n=25, 6.56%).29 Because of the very small percentage of upward 
departures, this study uses a dummy variable for downward departures as the outcome, 
modeled with binary logit.30  
A particular strength of the Maryland data is the granularity of the disposition 
field with respect to pleas. Some sentencing research distinguishes only between pleas 
and trials. Some studies separate pleas with agreements from pleas without agreements. 
The Maryland data further differentiate between what the Database refers to as ABA plea 
agreements and non-ABA plea agreements.  
An ABA plea agreement is a “plea agreement that a court has approved relating to 
a particular sentence, disposition, or other judicial action” (MSCCSP, 2015b: 2; see also 
Md. Code Regs. [COMAR] 14.22.01.02B(2)). Pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-243(c), ABA 
plea agreements bind the court. Other plea agreements, i.e. those which a judge has not 
approved, are non-ABA plea agreements and do not bind the court.  
An ABA plea agreement can therefore reduce uncertainty for court actors beyond 
the reduction achieved through ordinary plea agreements. It indicates consensus among 
all key members of the courtroom workgroup concerning an appropriate outcome for a 
particular defendant given his, her, or its crime. An ABA plea is hence different in kind 
from non-ABA plea agreements (or pleas without agreement). 
                                                          
29 This study used a slightly different definition of departures than the MSCCSP uses in analyzing 
guidelines compliance rates.  
30  If there had been more departures, particularly more upward departures, an ordinal or a multinomial 
logit model might have been more informative than a binary logit model of downward departures. As 
discussed further in Appendix III, these approaches were not practical. 
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Disposition type may vary by jurisdiction as a function of court community 
features. All else being equal, courtroom workgroups with more familiar and stable 
relationships should, for example, converge on more ABA pleas than jurisdictions with 
weaker workgroup relationships, as ABA pleas require greater agreement. To estimate 
geographical effects for this greater degree of agreement, this study uses binary logit, 
limited to those white-collar defendants reaching some form of plea agreement.31 
The vast majority of white-collar defendants in the Database extract pleaded 
guilty, either with an ABA plea agreement (n=113, 29.66%), a non-ABA plea agreement 
(n=153, 40.16%), or a plea without agreement (n=33, 8.66%). As is typical, few jury 
(n=15, 3.94%) and bench trials (n=5, 1.31%) occurred. These numbers include 
defendants for whom the disposition was originally missing in the Database extract, but 
was available from Case Search. For some cases though Case Search only indicated that 
the defendant pleaded guilty or went to trial, and not the specific type of plea or trial. 
Because these are still more informative than leaving the field missing, I recoded these 
defendants to guilty plea of unknown type (n=48, 12.60%) or trial of unknown type (n=3, 
.79%). 
e. Control Variables. 
The data contain a number of other individual case-level measures used as 
controls. These include defendant demographic characteristics such as the defendant’s 
                                                          
31 Although one could use a multinomial logit model to estimate geographical effects for all disposition 
types, this approach was not practical as discussed in Appendix III. ABA pleas are the outcome with the 
greatest theoretical interest (as compared to non-ABA plea agreements), so binary logit is sufficient. 
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age at sentence (average age was 40.76 years old), sex (approximately 40% female) and 
race (n=209 (54.86%) black, 149 (39.11%) white, 17 (4.46%) other or unidentifiable).32   
The data have four criminal history measures including: (1) whether the defendant 
had a current relationship with the criminal justice system33 at the time of the offense 
(n=36, 9.45%); a summary criminal conviction measure ranging from 0 to 5 (the average 
score was 1.00); whether the defendant had any prior parole or probation violations as an 
adult (n=37, 9.71%). The sum of these measures (and a delinquency score, which the 
Commission strips from the publicly available data) is the offender score, which can 
range from 0 to 9 (average score was 1.20). The primary analyses below rely on the total 
offender score, and use the components in robustness checks. 
Within the four categories of white-collar crimes considered in this study, most 
defendants received sentences for commercial frauds (n=232, 60.89%), followed by 
embezzlement (n=88, 23.10%), consumer protection law violations (n=40, 10.50%), and 
environmental crimes (n=21, 5.51%). Most of the convictions were for felonies (n=244, 
64.04%) as opposed to misdemeanors.34 The average statutory maximum carceral penalty 
was 127.50 months.  
                                                          
32 The defendant in at least one of the cases missing all the demographic variables was a company. 
33 Defined as “on parole, on probation, incarcerated, on work release, on mandatory supervision, an 
escapee, or had a comparable status” (MSCCSP, 2015b: 23). 
34 In Maryland, however, the distinction between misdemeanors and felonies is not the same as in much of 
the United States. In many places, crimes punishable by up to one year of incarceration are misdemeanors, 
while those punishable with more than one year of incarceration are felonies. Maryland has statutory 
misdemeanors punishable with ten years of more in prison, and at least one felony with a one year statutory 
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The Commission has classified all the conviction offenses used in the analyses as 
seriousness category V (n=327, 85.83%), VI (n=12, 3.15%), or VII (n=42, 11.02%). 
seriousness category VII is the least serious, and for the analyses I rescaled the 
seriousness categories from one to three, with three the most serious.35 The average 
rescaled seriousness category was 2.75. 
When assigning seriousness categories, the Commission considers the already 
established serious categories of offenses with comparable statutory maximum penalties, 
felony or misdemeanor levels, and substance. The primary analyses below rely on the 
seriousness category, and use the variables reflecting the Commission’s considerations in 
determining seriousness categories in robustness checks. 
The offender score and seriousness category together determine the recommended 
sentencing guidelines range. Taking the midpoint of the range, the average recommended 
sentence was 15.27 months. The primary analyses below rely on the offender score and 
seriousness category, and use the guidelines midpoint in robustness checks. 
The data include several additional case processing variables which could 
conceivably affect outcomes. They indicate the defendant’s representation type—Public 
Defender, private attorney, court appointed or self. The analyses use a dummy variable 
                                                          
maximum (see MSCCSP 2015b). Robustness checks, described in Appendix II controlled for this quirk in 
Maryland law, using felony classification and statutory maximum penalties. 
35 Given the few category VI and very few category VII offenses, combining categories VI and VII or just 
using a dummy variable for category V could have been another potential approach. I rescaled and kept the 
categories separate to preserve the original ordered character and maintain the admittedly limited variation.  
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for private defense attorney (n=248, 65.09%).36 Most defendants had a single conviction 
count (n=321, 84.25%), but some had two or more (n=60, 17.75%). A dummy variable 
for multiple offences controls for the effects of having additional conviction counts. As 
noted above the Commission is in the process of automating guidelines calculation. To 
control for possible instrumentation effects due to this change a dummy variable 
indicated whether the worksheet used was electronic (n=18, 4.72%). 
Sentencing practices change over time. This might be the result of changing 
general societal views on incarceration. Or it could be in response to a particular event 
(such as a financial crisis or a particularly high profile individual case) that might make 
white-collar crime a more salient issue. Alternately budgets change from year to year, 
imposing different practical constraints on criminal justice processes. The year of 
sentence therefore controls for period effects. Beginning with Fiscal Year 1999 coded as 
1, the mean fiscal year of sentence was 9.33. The primary analyses below rely on the 
fiscal year (as this more accurately reflects practical concerns such as available 
resources), and use calendar year (beginning with 1999 coded as 1, the mean calendar 
year was 8.86) as a robustness check. 
                                                          
36 This field was originally missing for approximately sixty white-collar defendants (about 15%). Using the 
Case Search website I identified an attorney for all but seven cases (about 2%). Although Case Search does 
not indicate whether the defendant has retained or the court has appointed private counsel, because less 
than one percent of cases in the Database extract (white-collar defendants and in general) indicate court-
appointed representation, for data-cleaning purposes I assumed the defendant had retained any private 
attorneys listed. Omitting these cases from the regressions affected the magnitudes and significance levels 
of several of the geographical variables. 
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Assuming that the case disposition is separate from and prior to the placement and 
departure decisions (rather than, for example, the parties simultaneously negotiating a 
guilty plea with an agreed sentence), conviction type also likely predicts placement and 
departures. Models for placement and departures therefore also include controls for 
conviction type with a series of dummy variables.  
This study demonstrates how geography affects placement, downward departures, 
and ABA pleas in white-collar cases in Maryland’s circuit courts. Doing so shows 
whether white-collar sentencing follows patterns observed in other contexts and 
consistent with theoretical predictions. This provides insight into the wider applicability 
of the earlier findings and theoretical perspectives, and raises potential equal justice 
concerns. 
f. Analytic Strategy 
Because the primary independent variable is a multicategory nominal variable, the 
choice of reference category matters a great deal. For each dependent variable’s final 
model, I therefore report three sets of results below, alternating the reference category 
between Baltimore City, the Eastern Shore counties, and Anne Arundel County. These 
counties differ considerably with respect to relevant features of their court communities. 
Baltimore City has by far the largest circuit court in Maryland, with thirty-three 
judgeships. This court has a large criminal caseload, and the city has high levels of 
violent crime. It is the most urbanized jurisdiction in Maryland, and is heavily 
Democratic.  
The Eastern Shore counties’ court communities are in some ways the opposite of 
Baltimore City. These are generally very small courts—four of the six Eastern Shore 
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counties in the data have only one judge each. The counties are largely rural and sparsely 
populated. The circuit courts have relatively light caseloads, and the communities are 
politically more conservative than Baltimore City. 
Anne Arundel County is somewhat in the middle. Of the five large counties it has 
the smallest court (twelve judgeships currently, though fewer prior to 2009). It has a 
smaller population and it is less densely populated than the other large counties, though 
greater population than any of the small court communities. And Anne Arundel is less 
urbanized than some of the other large counties. 
The court community perspective predicts that Baltimore City’s courts will 
sentence (conventional offenders) less severely (i.e., less likely to incarcerate, more likely 
to depart downwards) than other courts.37 The court community perspective would 
typically expect small courts in rural jurisdictions, as on the Eastern Shore, to sentence 
more severely than others. And for Anne Arundel County, we would generally expect to 
see a split between the other large courts sentencing less severely and the smaller courts 
sentencing more severely. But with white-collar offenders, the expected patterns for 
conventional sentencing data may not hold, and could plausibly be the opposite in some 
circumstances. For the ABA plea outcome, I expect courts that sentence less severely will 
be able to reach a greater level of agreement, and all else being equal will have more 
ABA pleas.  
                                                          
37 Baltimore City does have a high percentage minority population and high poverty levels, which theory 
predicts result in more severe outcomes. But the empirical literature has not consistently supported this 
prediction, and where it has often only conditionally so. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
a. Placement  
Table 3a displays the results of the logistic regression38 of any incarceration on 
the county and control variables (with Anne Arundel County as the reference category) 
for white-collar offenders. Model 1 shows the results with only the geographic variables 
as regressors. Model 2 controls for legitimate bases for differences in placement, the 
defendant’s criminal justice history (i.e., offender score) and the offense seriousness 
category. Model 3 adds controls for potential illegitimate influences on placement, the 
defendant’s demographic characteristics with sex (female=1), race (black=1), and age in 
years (along with age-squared). Model 4 includes the additional case processing 
characteristics as controls. The final model (Model 5) assumes case disposition is a 
distinct event from, and precedes, the placement decision, and hence controls for 
conviction type (the reference category is ABA plea). 
Model 5 shows the odds of a white-collar defendant receiving any carceral 
sentence are significantly higher in Prince George’s County (𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜 ≈ 4.36), the 
Eastern Shore counties (𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜 ≈ 8.07), the Southern Maryland counties 
(𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜 ≈ 8.46), and in the Other Counties (𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜 ≈ 6.06), than in Anne 
Arundel County.  
[Table 3a about here.] 
Those results are generally robust to alternate specifications of criminal justice history, 
crime seriousness, and year (Appendix II outlines robustness checks used). If one does 
                                                          
38 All regressions used Stata 14. All tables report the logit coefficients exponentiated into more easily 
interpretable odds ratios. 
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not accept Model 5’s assumption that conviction type precedes the placement decision, 
Model 4 shows that except in Montgomery County, controlling for disposition type has 
little effect on the geographic variables’ odds ratios. Without controlling for disposition 
Montgomery County also has marginally higher odds of placement (𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜 ≈
2.36), whereas it is not significant when controlling for disposition type. 
Table 3b shows how the odds ratios for the geographic variables differ for 
Model 5 of Table 3a depending on the reference category. (The first column, with Anne 
Arundel as the reference category, simply repeats the results from Model 5) 
[Table 3b about here.]. 
The odds ratios are significantly lower in Baltimore City (center column of Table 3b) 
than everywhere except Anne Arundel County and the Western Maryland counties 
(Baltimore County is marginal). With Baltimore City as the reference category, the odds 
ratios for white-collar defendants are approximately equal to 3.07 for Baltimore County, 
3.38 for Montgomery County, 9.64 for Prince George’s County, 17.85 for the Eastern 
Shore, 18.7 for Southern Maryland counties, and 13.39 for the Other Counties.  
The Eastern Shore counties have significantly higher odds of incarceration than 
Anne Arundel County (𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜 ≈ .124), Baltimore City (𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜 ≈ .056), 
Baltimore County (𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜 ≈ .172), Montgomery County (𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜 ≈ .189), 
and the Western Maryland Counties (𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜 ≈ .103).  
Several of the control variables in Model 5 (and Table 3b) also have significant 
results, generally in the directions one would anticipate. Higher offender scores and 
offense seriousness categories significantly increase the odds of placement, which is both 
reassuring and unsurprising. Age slightly increases the likelihood of incarceration, but at 
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a marginally declining rate. White-collar defendants with a private defense attorney are 
significantly less likely to receive a carceral sentence. This could be a status effect, but 
might simply be a function of having a lawyer with more time to devote to one’s case. 
Those with more than one count at conviction are significantly more likely to receive 
placement, which is expected given that these are likely more serious cases. Over time 
there is a slight decrease in the odds of incarceration.  
Unexpectedly, women convicted of a white-collar crime are marginally more 
likely to receive a carceral sentence than men. Daly (1989), using the Wheeler, Weisburd, 
and Bode (1982) data, assesses gender differences in white-collar crime (with an offense-
based definition). Daly shows that female white-collar criminals in the Yale data 
generally had lower a socioeconomic status than males. They were more likely to be 
clerical workers (as opposed to managerial or professional workers), black, and 
unconnected to the labor force, as well as less likely to have completed a four-year 
college degree. If white-collar female offenders in the Maryland data extract similarly 
had lower socioeconomic status than male white-collar offenders, their higher odds of 
incarceration may reflect less resources or power to secure release. 
White-collar defendants receiving a non-ABA plea agreement have significantly 
lower odds of incarceration than defendants with an ABA plea. This is an additional 
unexpected result, without an obvious explanation. 
Table 4a displays the same models as Table 3a, using incarceration subsequent to 
sentencing, rather than any carceral sentence, as the measure of placement. The results 
from the final modal (Model 5) are largely similar to the results from Table 3a with 
respect to significance and direction (i.e., less than one or greater than one) of the 
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geographic variables. The magnitudes are sometimes somewhat larger, however, and 
Baltimore City is now significantly different from Anne Arundel County.  
[Table 4a about here.] 
The geographical results for Model 5 of Table 4a are also generally robust to alternate 
specifications (see Appendix II), as was the case for any incarceration, particularly with 
respect to significance and direction, though less so as for magnitude. 
Table 4b, as with Table 3b, again shows how the odds ratios for the geographic 
variables differ depending on the reference category. With Anne Arundel as the reference 
category (Model 5 of Table 4a and the first column of Table 4b), the odds of a white-
collar defendant receiving placement after sentencing were significantly lower in 
Baltimore City (𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜 ≈ .25), higher in Prince George’s County (𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜 ≈
3.65), the Eastern Shore counties (𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜 ≈ 12.19), the Southern Maryland 
counties (𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜 ≈ 11.62), and in the Other Counties (𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜 ≈ 8.01). 
The odds ratios are significantly lower in Baltimore City (the middle column of 
Table 4b) than everywhere else (Western Maryland is marginal). Compared to Baltimore 
City, the odds ratios are approximately equal to 3.99 for Anne Arundel County, .4.74 for 
Baltimore County, 4.69 for Montgomery County, 14.58 for Prince George’s County, 48.7 
for the Eastern Shore, 4.96 for Western Maryland, 46.4 for Southern Maryland, and 32.01 
for the Other Counties. 
The Eastern Shore counties have significantly higher odds of incarceration after 
sentencing than Anne Arundel County (𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜 ≈ .08), Baltimore City 
(𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜 ≈ .02), and Baltimore, Montgomery, and the Western Maryland Counties 
(𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜 ≈ .1). 
56 
 
Some of the control variables in Table 4b (and Model 5 of Table 4a) once again 
have significant results for postsentencing placement. These were generally the same as 
in Table 3b, except that none of the demographic variables had a significant effect. 
Collectively, the results for the two measures of the placement outcome are, 
contrary to my prediction, fairly similar, for white-collar defendants to what one would 
expect in data on conventional sentencing. The Eastern Shore was more likely to 
incarcerate white-collar defendants than most other courts, while Baltimore City was 
least likely to do so. And many of the significant odds ratios were substantively quite 
large in magnitude.  
The pre-Guidelines research on federal white-collar sentencing associated 
prioritization of white-collar cases with sentencing leniency (see Hagan, Nagel, & 
Albonetti, 1980). Anne Arundel was the modal county in the current analyses, accounting 
for approximately one quarter of white-collar cases. While Anne Arundel had lower odds 
of placement than several others, we should not read too much into this as a prioritization 
effect, as characterizing ninety-seven cases out of thousands (over a fifteen year period) 
as prioritizing white-collar crime would be rather dubious. Even if one views Anne 
Arundel County as analogous to District C, Anne Arundel County had significantly 
higher odds of postsentencing placement than Baltimore City. So Anne Arundel County 
was not even strictly the most lenient. 
But examining the results more closely, they were not uniformly consistent with 
what the court community perspective would predict for conventional crime. Across both 
measures of placement, the odds ratios for Prince George’s County, the second largest 
court community, showed a significantly higher likelihood of placement compared to 
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Anne Arundel County, and were not significantly different from the small court 
communities on the Eastern Shore. This is also different from what one would predict 
based on Paternoster et al. (2003; 2004), where Prince George’s County was more lenient 
(i.e., less likely to impose the death penalty) than others. For Anne Arundel County the 
odds did not differ significantly from some of the larger counties (including Baltimore 
City for the any placement measure) or for the fairly small Western Maryland court 
communities (which also did not differ from Baltimore City for any placement). Granted 
Prince George’s and Anne Arundel are only two counties, but with only nine geographic 
categories in these data two are not obviously trivial. 
b. Departures  
While the results for placement of white-collar offenders did not differ drastically 
from a conventional sentencing story, the results for downward departure are quite 
different, and much more consistent with my predictions. Table 5a shows the binary 
logistic regression for downward departures. Model 5 indicates that controlling for the 
defendant’s criminal justice history, offense seriousness, demographic characteristics, 
case processing variables, and disposition,39 Baltimore City has significantly lower odds 
of a downward departure (𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜 ≈ .04) than Anne Arundel County, the reference 
category. 
[Table 5a about here.] 
                                                          
39 The models for placement control for each of jury trials, bench trials, and trials of unknown type. 
Including these as separate terms in the model for downward departures results in eighteen observations 
perfectly predicted and not used. To avoid losing observations the model for downward departures 
combined all trials into a single category.  
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When varying the reference category for the geographic variables, Baltimore City 
is the only jurisdiction with significantly different odds of a downward departure for 
white-collar defendants than the others.40 Baltimore City has significantly lower odds of 
a downward departure than everywhere else except Prince George’s County, the Eastern 
Shore counties, and the Other Counties (Table 5b, center column). The odds of a 
downward departure are significantly higher in Anne Arundel County (𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜 ≈
23.99), Baltimore County (𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜 ≈ 15.61), Montgomery County (𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜 ≈
15.04), the Western Maryland counties (𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜 ≈ 29.38), and the Southern 
Maryland counties (𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜 ≈ 11.49) than in Baltimore City.  
[Table 5b about here.] 
These results are less robust to different specifications than placement (see 
Appendix II). Magnitudes of the odds ratios vary a lot under some specifications. With 
only approximately 20% of defendants in these data receiving downward departures, 
sensitivity is to be expected, and bespeaks the need for caution in interpreting the results. 
But the substantive conclusion that a white-collar defendant has multiple times better 
odds of a downward departure nearly anywhere in Maryland compared to the largest 
court community in Baltimore City is, however, generally consistent,41 and is the 
                                                          
40 Additional analyses, not shown but available upon request, rotated each geographic unit as the reference 
category. Across all specifications only Baltimore City differed significantly from any of the other 
categories. 
41 The null results for Prince George’s County, the second largest court community, are still generally 
consistent with the overall narrative of larger courts sentencing more severely. The Eastern Shore counties 
are not consistent with this narrative, but they were only just below marginally significant, with p≈.11, 
using a two-tailed test to be conservative.  
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opposite of what the court community perspective would predict for conventional 
offenders.42 
With respect to control variables, defendants with more extensive criminal justice 
histories have significantly higher odds ratios of a downward departure. This might seem 
counterintuitive, but because the guidelines increase nonlinearly (see Bushway & Piehl, 
2011), towards the upper end a one unit increase in an offender score can greatly increase 
the recommendation, which might induce more departures as a substantively rational 
local correction to the guidelines (see Kramer & Ulmer, 2002). The other control 
variables are generally unsurprising. The odds of a downward departure have increased 
over time for white-collar defendants, consistent with overall patterns of slightly 
increasing departures in Maryland’s circuit courts. Defendants sentenced for more than 
one count have significantly lower odds of a downward departure, and the odds ratio for 
defendants convicted by trial are marginally lower, but with a large magnitude.  
c. ABA Pleas  
Table 6a shows, given reaching a plea agreement, the odds ratios of a white-collar 
defendant obtaining an ABA plea, relative to a non-ABA plea. Model 4 indicates that, 
controlling for offender score, offense seriousness, demographic characteristics, and case 
processing variables, the odds of an ABA plea are significantly higher in Baltimore City 
(𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜 ≈ 253.21), Montgomery County (𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜 ≈ 33.24), Prince George’s 
County (𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜 ≈ 101.26), the Southern Maryland counties (𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜 ≈ 21.4), 
and the Other Counties (𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜 ≈ 29.62) than in Anne Arundel County. 
                                                          
42 It is also different from what one would expect based on Paternoster et al. (2003; 2004), in which 
Baltimore City was less likely than the other jurisdictions to impose the death penalty. 
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Robustness checks (see Appendix II) produced similar results in terms of significance 
and direction, but the magnitudes of some odds ratios became much larger under some 
alternate specifications. And as with the other outcomes discussed above, the reference 
county matters for the odds of an ABA plea relative to a non-ABA plea, as shown in 
Table 6b. 
[Tables 6a and 6b about here.] 
The odds of an ABA plea relative to a non-ABA plea agreement are significantly 
higher for Baltimore City than everywhere else, except Prince George’s County. 
Compared to Baltimore City, the odds ratios are approximately equal to .004 for Anne 
Arundel County, .003 for Baltimore County, .13 for Montgomery County, .004 for the 
Eastern Shore counties, .01 for the Western Maryland counties, .09 for the Southern 
Maryland counties, and .12 for the Other Counties.  
Compared to the Eastern Shore counties, most other jurisdictions had significantly 
higher odds of an ABA plea (relative to a non-ABA plea). The odds were higher for 
Baltimore City (𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜 ≈ 246.11), Montgomery County (𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜 ≈ 32.31), 
Prince George’s County (𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜 ≈ 98.42), the Southern Maryland Counties 
(𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜 ≈ 20.8), and the Other Counties (𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜 ≈ 28.79).  
With respect to control variables, neither offender score nor offense seriousness 
significantly affected the odds of receiving an ABA plea relative to a non-ABA plea; 
there is not necessarily a reason why they should have. Black defendants were 
significantly less likely, and female defendants marginally less likely, to receive an ABA 
plea than nonblack or male defendants. If white-collar crime committed by black or 
female offenders is less of a “normal crime” (Sudnow, 1965), which seems plausible, 
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there may be less of a consensus or no going rate, making ABA pleas more difficult for 
these defendants. More than one sentencing count at sentencing significantly decreased 
the odds of achieving an ABA plea. This makes sense as these are more complex cases, 
likely requiring more negotiation. Use of an electronic sentencing guidelines worksheet 
also decreased the odds of an ABA plea. 
Whether these results support the prediction that courts that sentence white-collar 
offenders less severely will be more likely to reach ABA plea agreement depends on the 
measure of severity used. For the departure outcome, these results do not support the 
prediction. Baltimore City, the jurisdiction least likely to grant a downward departure, 
was more likely than almost any other to reach an ABA plea, with some rather extreme 
odds ratios. For the Eastern Shore counties though, which was more severe than most in 
terms of placement, several other courts that were less likely to give a white-collar 
defendant a carceral sentence were more likely to reach an ABA plea. These were not 
consistently the larger or smaller court communities. The counties significantly different 
from Anne Arundel in terms of the odds of an ABA plea do not seem systemically related 
to those with which it differed on odds of placement. 
d. Summary and Conclusion  
The results provide inconsistent and mixed support for the predictions based on 
the focal concerns and court community literatures. Some of the findings are very similar 
to what one would expect for a general offender sentencing sample. But others suggest 
that, in some instances, different dynamics may be in play with white-collar sentencing in 
Maryland. Table 7 summarizes the main findings, while Figure 1 presents the mean 
predicted probability by county (or region) for each outcome measure. 
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[Table 7 and Figure 1 about here.] 
Figure 1 shows that while the several of the small jurisdictions have the highest mean 
predicted probabilities of placement of white-collar defendants, the second largest court 
community in Prince George’s County is not far behind, particularly on the any 
placement measure. As suggested above, the small Western Maryland court 
communities’ mean predicted probability of placement is more similar to some of the 
larger court communities, and Anne Arundel’s (the smallest of the large court 
communities) mean predicted probability is slightly lower than some of the other large 
counties. 
The mean predicted probabilities for downward departures show less variation. 
But interestingly the largest court community, which the logistic regression results 
showed as significantly less likely than others to depart downwards for white-collar 
offenders (Baltimore City) does not have the lowest predicted probability.43 The 
regression results for downward departures concerning Baltimore City are substantively 
noteworthy, because they identify an area in which white-collar sentencing appears to 
have the exact opposite pattern from local contexts research on conventional sentencing. 
The low mean predicted probability for Montgomery County, not reflected in significant 
regression results, might be a function of its caseload composition; unlike in the other 
                                                          
43 Note, however, that the mean predicted probability depends not only on court-specific practices, but also 
on case composition. If all else being equal a court sentences leniently but sentences many white-collar 
defendants with more than one conviction count or has a larger number of trials, for example, the predicted 
probabilities of a downward departure reflect both, rather than being a pure county effect. 
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jurisdictions, a large majority of the cases in Montgomery County involved 
embezzlement.44 
As to the probability of an ABA plea, the very high mean predict probabilities for 
Baltimore City and Prince George’s County stand out (along with their improbably large 
regression coefficients45). It is intriguing that the largest court community was most 
likely to reach an ABA plea and seemed least likely to depart downwards for white-collar 
defendants, while the second largest court community was next most likely to reach an 
ABA plea and was one of the only not significantly more likely than Baltimore City to 
depart downwards. Although contrary to my initial expectation concerning lenient 
sentencing and ABA pleas, in retrospect the connection between ABA pleas and 
departures perhaps should not have been surprising—if there is greater consensus and 
firmly established going rates, there may be less need to depart. 
Baltimore City and Prince George’s County are the two largest court 
communities. They also have the highest percentage of the population minority. In both 
jurisdictions Democrats vastly outnumber Republicans (approximately 10:1). For 
Baltimore City the poverty level is also quite high. (See Maryland Department of 
                                                          
44 This raises the troubling possibility that these and other apparent results might actually be artifacts of 
nonsubstantive charging behavior or other administrative or recordkeeping practices. Some State’s 
Attorneys, for example, might be charging identical conduct under other provisions, such as general theft 
statutes rather than embezzlement, or vice versa. 
45 One need not necessarily believe the exact magnitudes of the numbers to accept that they indicate that a 
white-collar defendant in Baltimore City or Prince George’s County is much more likely, all else being 
equal, to reach an ABA plea agreement, relative to a non-ABA plea agreement, than a white-collar 
defendant in Anne Arundel County or the Eastern Shore. 
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Planning, 2012; Maryland State Board of Elections, 2014a.) Although the general local 
contexts literature has found little effect for political and demographic factors of a 
community, it is possible that the similarities between these two jurisdictions reflects not 
only larger courts perceiving white-collar offenders as more of a threat to the community, 
but also something of a backlash against relatively privileged offenders committing 




Local effects for white-collar defendants, and local effects that are unanticipated 
based on the general sentencing literature, are not as much results as they are questions. 
This exploratory effort has of necessity focused on establishing whether and what. But 
the more meaningful, important, and substantively interesting question is why. Why does 
a white-collar offenders’ likelihood of receiving a downward departure, and to a lesser 
extent a carceral sentence, not only vary depending on which (Maryland circuit) court 
sentences that defendant, but seems to vary differently from conventional offenders? 
Although I have offered some speculation, what is driving the results is unclear. Dummy 
variables for localities are a fairly blunt instrument, and readily available information 
may be unable to explain the differences. This underscores the need for further research 
in this area 
This study has several substantial limitations. It used highly selected cross-
sectional data, with a relatively low numbers observations, and little variation for several 
key fields. Robustness checks showed sensitivity of the magnitudes of some of the 
results. As with many sentencing datasets, the Database extract lacks predispositional 
outcomes and good measures of theoretically important constructs. 
Notwithstanding and subject to those weaknesses, this study showed that 
outcomes in white-collar sentencing in Maryland’s circuit courts vary significantly across 
location, even when controlling for a variety of case characteristics. Where the local 
contexts of sentencing literature has so far largely overlooked white-collar crime, these 
are meaningful findings that begin to fill gaps and connect the white-collar sentencing 
and local contexts of sentencing literatures.  
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White-collar sentencing research has not (recently) paid much heed to the role of 
place, particularly in state courts. Local contexts of sentencing research has directed little 
attention specifically to white-collar crime. This study showed that not only did white-
collar placement and departures vary in Maryland state courts according to place, they do 
so in ways not entirely anticipated by existing theoretical perspectives and social contexts 
research focusing on conventional criminal cases. In Maryland, larger and more urban 
court communities are not uniformly more lenient when it comes to white-collar 
sentencing than smaller and more rural court communities, in apparent contradiction to 
what seems to be the most consistent finding from more general social contexts research   
Given the limitations of the data, and what are rather modest results, future 
research is necessary to expand upon this study. Research using white-collar data from 
other states, ideally with more observations, greater variation, and better measures of 
white-collar crime, should establish whether this study’s results are peculiar to Maryland, 
the selected offenses, or both. If data permit, multilevel analyses should formally test the 
relationships between court- or county-level characteristics and individual level 
outcomes, including cross-level interactions, for white-collar offenders.  
Future research should also dig deeper into this study’s findings as concerns 
Maryland. This study posited that ABA pleas have special theoretical significance, 
indicating stronger courtroom workgroup relationships. The results concerning ABA 
pleas were, however, somewhat unclear. Qualitative research could investigate what is 
truly happening in ABA pleas, which might provide insight into the extremely large odds 
ratios estimated.  
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We know earlier case decisions can affect later outcomes, as reflected in the 
Paternoster and colleagues research. But the Database extract used in this study cannot be 
used to address these earlier decisions. As quantitative data on these early outcomes are 
unavailable, qualitative research might also be able to examine how these processes, 
particularly charging decisions, vary across jurisdictions and ultimately affect outcomes 
for white-collar offenders.  
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Table 1a: Distribution of Cases by County (and Region) and Offense Type 









83 5 3 6 97 
Baltimore City 46 0 3 1 50 
Baltimore County 30 13 4 4 51 
Montgomery 16 4 0 50 70 
















Dorchester 2 0 0 2 4 
Queen Anne's 0 0 0 3 3 
Somerset 0 0 1 0 1 
Talbot 0 0 1 1 2 
Wicomico 4 0 4 0 8 
 












26 Charles 14 3 1 2 20 
Saint Mary's 1 0 0 1 2 
            












19 Frederick 3 8 0 1 12 















Howard 4 4 1 3 12 
 












ABA Plea  
(vs. Non-ABA  
Plea Agreement) 
 No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Anne Arundel 81 16 75 22 78 19 62 6 
Baltimore City 41 7 35 13 39 9 5 37 
Baltimore County 38 12 35 15 38 12 31 3 
Montgomery 48 21 43 26 61 8 18 28 
Prince George's 15 15 12 18 25 5 2 16 
Eastern Shore 8 13 8 13 17 4 12 2 
Southern MD 10 16 9 17 20 6 7 11 
Western MD 13 6 13 6 15 4 12 3 
Other Counties 6 9 6 9 13 2 4 7 
         




Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
(N=381, Except as Noted) 
Variable Obs % Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min. Max. 
County or Region       
 Anne Arundel 97 25.46%     
 Baltimore City 50 13.12%     
 Baltimore County 51 13.39%     
 Montgomery 70 18.37%     
 Prince George's 32 8.40%     
 Eastern Shore 21 5.51%     
 Southern MD 26 6.82%     
 Western MD 19 4.99%     
 Other (Central MD) 15 3.94%     
        
Any Placement       
 No 236 61.94%     
 Yes 139 36.48%     
 Missing 6 1.57%     
       
Postsentencing Placement       
 No 260 68.24%     
 Yes 115 30.18%     
 Missing 6 1.57%     
       
Departures       
 Downward  69 18.11%     
 Within Guidelines 281 73.75%     
 Upward  25 6.56%     
 Missing 6 1.57%     
       
Disposition       
 ABA Plea 113 29.66%     
 Non-ABA Plea Agreement 153 40.16%     
 Plea, No Agreement 33 8.66%     
 Guilty Plea Unknown Type 48 12.60%     
 Bench Trial 5 1.31%     
 Jury Trial 15 3.94%     
 Trial Unknown Type 3 0.79%     
 Missing 11 2.89%     
       
Offender Score   1.20 1.97 0 7 
       
Offense Seriousness Category   2.75 0.64 1 3 
       
Guidelines Midpoint (Months)   15.27 30.65 0 330 
      
Current Criminal Justice Relationship      
 No 343 90.03%     
 Yes 36 9.45%     
 Missing 2 .52%     
      




Table 2: Descriptive Statistics (Continued) 
(N=381, Except as Noted) 
Variable Obs % Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min. Max. 
Prior Parole/Probation Violation       
 No 342 89.76%     
 Yes 37 9.71%     
 Missing 2 0.52%     
       
Offense Type       
 Commercial Fraud 232 60.89%     
 Consumer Protection 40 10.50%     
 Environmental 21 5.51%     
 Embezzlement 88 23.10%     
       
Offense Level       
 Misdemeanor 137 35.96%     
 Felony 244 64.04%     
        
Statutory Maximum Carceral Penalty (Months) 127.50 65.77 12 180 
        
Sex        
 Male 229 60.10%     
 Female 151 39.63%     
 Missing 1 0.26%     
       
Race       
 Black 209 54.86%     
 White 149 39.11%     
 Other or Unidentifiable 17 4.46%     
 Missing 6 1.57%     
       
Age at Sentencing (n=377)   40.76 11.93 18.31 83.92 
       
Private Attorney       
 No 126 33.07%     
 Yes 248 65.09%     
 Missing 7 1.84%     
       
Counts at Sentencing       
 Single Count 321 84.25%     
 >1 Count 60 15.75%     
       
Worksheet Type       
 Paper 363 95.28%     
 Electronic 18 4.72%     
       
Fiscal Year Sentenced (FY 99=1)   9.33 4.17 1 16 
      
Calendar Year Sentenced (CY 99=1)  8.86 4.20 1 16 
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Table 3a: Logistic Regression of Any Incarceration 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
 Odds Ratio (SE) Odds Ratio (SE) Odds Ratio (SE) Odds Ratio (SE) Odds Ratio (SE) 
Baltimore City 1.266 (0.513) 0.832 (0.369) 0.842 (0.379) 0.734 (0.346) 0.452 (0.255) 
Baltimore County 1.461 (0.573) 1.106 (0.476) 1.229 (0.539) 1.427 (0.660) 1.389 (0.700) 
Montgomery 2.061* (0.716) 2.050† (0.765) 2.072† (0.807) 2.358† (1.034) 1.528 (0.725) 
Prince George’s 5.114** (2.274) 5.397** (2.589) 4.364** (2.228) 5.828** (3.191) 4.361* (2.566) 
Eastern Shore 5.540** (2.829) 5.855** (3.165) 7.962** (4.910) 7.521** (4.774) 8.074** (5.451) 
Western MD 1.573 (0.865) 1.187 (0.701) 1.300 (0.788) 0.812 (0.522) 0.828 (0.553) 
Southern MD 6.439** (3.080) 6.828** (3.511) 6.518** (3.374) 8.810** (4.806) 8.461** (5.034) 
Other Counties 5.114** (2.967) 5.297** (3.341) 6.241** (4.044) 6.923** (4.653) 6.059* (4.306) 
Offender Score   1.442** (0.092) 1.446** (0.097) 1.460** (0.106) 1.520** (0.118) 
Offense Seriousness   2.123** (0.525) 1.967** (0.491) 1.825* (0.479) 2.025* (0.599) 
Female     1.303 (0.348) 1.448 (0.408) 1.632† (0.481) 
Black     0.840 (0.224) 0.739 (0.208) 0.810 (0.239) 
Age (years)     1.146* (0.074) 1.143* (0.077) 1.147† (0.083) 
Age2      0.999* (0.001) 0.999† (0.001) 0.999† (0.001) 
Private Attorney       0.435** (0.128) 0.373** (0.116) 
>1 Count       2.575** (0.900) 2.698** (1.021) 
MAGS case       0.422 (0.337) 0.711 (0.584) 
Fiscal Year       0.946 (0.033) 0.937† (0.035) 
Non-ABA Plea         0.382* (0.152) 
Plea, No Agreement         1.127 (0.596) 
Plea, Type Unknown         0.802 (0.362) 
Bench Trial         0.475 (0.512 
Jury Trial         2.871 (2.121) 
Trial, Type Unknown         2.103 (3.032) 
Constant 0.293 (0.071) 0.024 (0.018) 0.002 (0.003) 0.005 (0.008) 0.005 (0.009) 
      
Observations 375 375 366 360 355 
      




Table 3b: Varying the Reference Category in Model 5 of Table 3a (N=355) 
 Reference=Anne Arundel  Reference=Baltimore City   Reference=Eastern Shore 
 †p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01 Odds Ratio SE Odds Ratio SE Odds Ratio SE 
Anne Arundel - - 2.211 1.246 0.124** 0.084 
Baltimore City 0.452 0.255 - - 0.056** 0.045 
Baltimore County 1.389 0.7 3.070† 1.959 0.172* 0.127 
Montgomery 1.528 0.725 3.377* 1.892 0.189* 0.136 
Prince George’s 4.361* 2.566 9.639** 6.346 0.54 0.428 
Eastern Shore 8.074** 5.451 17.849** 14.436 - - 
Western MD 0.828 0.553 1.831 1.397 0.103** 0.088 
Southern MD 8.461** 5.034 18.703** 12.521 1.048 0.838 
Other Counties 6.059* 4.306 13.394** 10.323 0.75 0.657 
Offender Score 1.520** 0.118 1.520** 0.118 1.520** 0.118 
Offense Seriousness 2.025* 0.599 2.025* 0.599 2.025* 0.599 
Female 1.632† 0.481 1.632† 0.481 1.632† 0.481 
Black 0.81 0.239 0.81 0.239 0.81 0.239 
Age (years) 1.147† 0.083 1.147† 0.083 1.147† 0.083 
Age2  0.999† 0.001 0.999† 0.001 0.999† 0.001 
Private Attorney 0.373** 0.116 0.373** 0.116 0.373** 0.116 
>1 Count 2.698** 1.021 2.698** 1.021 2.698** 1.021 
MAGS case 0.711 0.584 0.711 0.584 0.711 0.584 
Fiscal Year 0.937† 0.035 0.937† 0.035 0.937† 0.035 
NonABA Plea 0.382* 0.152 0.382* 0.152 0.382* 0.152 
Plea, No Agreement 1.127 0.596 1.127 0.596 1.127 0.596 
Plea, Type Unknown 0.802 0.362 0.802 0.362 0.802 0.362 
Bench Trial 0.475 0.512 0.475 0.512 0.475 0.512 
Jury Trial 2.871 2.121 2.871 2.121 2.871 2.121 
Trial, Type Unknown 2.103 3.032 2.103 3.032 2.103 3.032 
Constant 0.005 0.009 0.002 0.004 0.04 0.072 
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Table 4a: Logistic Regression of Incarceration After Sentencing 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
 Odds Ratio (SE) Odds Ratio (SE) Odds Ratio (SE) Odds Ratio (SE) Odds Ratio (SE) 
Baltimore City 0.864 (0.425) 0.537 (0.284) 0.530 (0.284) 0.393† (0.222) 0.250* (0.165) 
Baltimore County 1.599 (0.687) 1.214 (0.566) 1.266 (0.594) 1.289 (0.644) 1.187 (0.654) 
Montgomery 2.215* (0.838) 2.241* (0.910) 2.298* (0.963) 1.835 (0.861) 1.173 (0.597) 
Prince George’s 5.063** (2.310) 5.373** (2.656) 4.066** (2.149) 4.919** (2.833) 3.650* (2.281) 
Eastern Shore 8.227** (4.328) 9.627** (5.420) 11.025** (6.892) 10.358** (6.730) 12.192** (8.446) 
Western MD 2.337 (1.319) 1.874 (1.130) 1.939 (1.205) 1.133 (0.746) 1.241 (0.855) 
Southern MD 8.100** (3.946) 8.914** (4.689) 8.514** (4.497) 11.648** (6.559) 11.617** (7.085) 
Other Counties 7.594** (4.509) 8.378** (5.437) 8.662** (5.752) 8.445** (5.987) 8.014** (6.069) 
Offender Score   1.424** (0.092) 1.421** (0.095) 1.453** (0.107) 1.523** (0.121) 
Offense Seriousness   2.337** (0.648) 2.160** (0.603) 2.112* (0.637) 2.528** (0.878) 
Female     0.903 (0.255) 0.946 (0.283) 1.020 (0.320) 
Black     0.835 (0.233) 0.715 (0.215) 0.797 (0.251) 
Age (years)     1.068 (0.068) 1.063 (0.071) 1.055 (0.075) 
Age2      0.999 (0.001) 0.999 (0.001) 1.000 (0.001) 
Private Attorney       0.529* (0.165) 0.454* (0.152) 
>1 Count       4.326** (1.585) 4.721** (1.878) 
MAGS case       1.173 (0.954) 2.267 (1.929) 
Fiscal Year       0.925* (0.035) 0.919* (0.038) 
Non-ABA Plea         0.374* (0.161) 
Plea, No Agreement         1.255 (0.685) 
Plea, Type Unknown         1.102 (0.526) 
Bench Trial         0.575 (0.654) 
Jury Trial         2.733 (2.023) 
Trial, Type Unknown         2.587 (3.764) 
Constant 0.198 (0.054) 0.012 (0.010) 0.004 (0.007) 0.012 (0.021) 0.011 (0.022) 
      
Observations 375 375 366 360 355 
      




Table 4b: Varying the Reference Category in Model 5 of Table 4a (N=355) 
  Reference=Anne Arundel  Reference=Baltimore City   Reference=Eastern Shore 
 †p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01 Odds Ratio SE Odds Ratio SE Odds Ratio SE 
Anne Arundel - - 3.994* 2.63 0.082** 0.057 
Baltimore City 0.250* 0.165 - - 0.021** 0.018 
Baltimore County 1.187 0.654 4.742* 3.414 0.097** 0.074 
Montgomery 1.173 0.597 4.687* 3.015 0.096** 0.072 
Prince George’s 3.650* 2.281 14.579** 10.998 0.299 0.243 
Eastern Shore 12.192** 8.446 48.700** 42.574 - - 
Western MD 1.241 0.855 4.958† 4.075 0.102** 0.087 
Southern MD 11.617** 7.085 46.404** 34.512 0.953 0.757 
Other Counties 8.014** 6.069 32.011** 27.556 0.657 0.589 
Offender Score 1.523** 0.121 1.523** 0.121 1.523** 0.121 
Offense Seriousness 2.528** 0.878 2.528** 0.878 2.528** 0.878 
Female 1.02 0.32 1.02 0.32 1.02 0.32 
Black 0.797 0.251 0.797 0.251 0.797 0.251 
Age (years) 1.055 0.075 1.055 0.075 1.055 0.075 
Age2  1 0.001 1 0.001 1 0.001 
Private Attorney 0.454* 0.152 0.454* 0.152 0.454* 0.152 
>1 Count 4.721** 1.878 4.721** 1.878 4.721** 1.878 
MAGS case 2.267 1.929 2.267 1.929 2.267 1.929 
Fiscal Year 0.919* 0.038 0.919* 0.038 0.919* 0.038 
NonABA Plea 0.374* 0.161 0.374* 0.161 0.374* 0.161 
Plea, No Agreement 1.255 0.685 1.255 0.685 1.255 0.685 
Plea, Type Unknown 1.102 0.526 1.102 0.526 1.102 0.526 
Bench Trial 0.575 0.654 0.575 0.654 0.575 0.654 
Jury Trial 2.733 2.023 2.733 2.023 2.733 2.023 
Trial, Type Unknown 2.587 3.764 2.587 3.764 2.587 3.764 
Constant 0.011 0.022 0.003 0.006 0.139 0.255 
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Table 5a: Logistic Regression of Downward Departures 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
 Odds Ratio (SE) Odds Ratio (SE) Odds Ratio (SE) Odds Ratio (SE) Odds Ratio (SE) 
Anne Arundel - - - - - - - - - - 
Baltimore City 0.947 (0.426) 0.246† (0.185) 0.219* (0.168) 0.230† (0.193) 0.042** (0.047) 
Baltimore County 1.296 (0.542) 0.738 (0.473) 0.839 (0.542) 0.748 (0.512) 0.650 (0.505) 
Montgomery 0.538 (0.245) 0.454 (0.319) 0.490 (0.354) 0.968 (0.800) 0.627 (0.586) 
Prince George’s 0.821 (0.454) 0.287 (0.255) 0.275 (0.252) 0.200 (0.205) 0.171 (0.189) 
Eastern Shore 0.966 (0.591) 0.322 (0.294) 0.242 (0.247) 0.361 (0.383) 0.465 (0.572) 
Western MD 1.095 (0.677) 0.447 (0.416) 0.631 (0.605) 1.327 (1.344) 1.224 (1.314) 
Southern MD 1.232 (0.654) 0.914 (0.735) 0.942 (0.746) 0.745 (0.656) 0.479 (0.475) 
Other Counties 0.632 (0.506) 0.139 (0.201) 0.173 (0.265) 0.155 (0.221) 0.121 (0.177) 
Offender Score   2.822** (0.313) 2.712** (0.306) 3.134** (0.436) 3.549** (0.583) 
Offense Seriousness   1.059 (0.363) 1.089 (0.394) 1.051 (0.391) 1.119 (0.466) 
Female     0.532 (0.263) 0.533 (0.280) 0.618 (0.350) 
Black     0.863 (0.384) 1.079 (0.514) 1.380 (0.715) 
Age (years)     1.216 (0.177) 1.267 (0.209) 1.324 (0.242) 
Age2      0.998 (0.002) 0.997 (0.002) 0.997 (0.002) 
Private Attorney       3.121* (1.690) 2.734† (1.604) 
>1 Count       0.133** (0.099) 0.124* (0.105) 
MAGS case       0.048 (0.114) 0.027 (0.079) 
Fiscal Year       1.142* (0.073) 1.181* (0.087) 
Non-ABA Plea         0.345 (0.255) 
Plea, No Agreement         0.232 (0.212) 
Plea, Type Unknown         0.337 (0.314) 
Any Trial         0.064† (0.097) 
Constant 0.244 (0.062) 0.043 (0.043) 0.001 (0.003) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
      
Observations 375 375 366 360 355 
      




Table 5b: Varying the Reference Category in Model 5 of Table 5a (N=355) 
  Reference=Anne Arundel  Reference=Baltimore City   Reference=Eastern Shore 
 †p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01 Odds Ratio SE Odds Ratio SE Odds Ratio SE 
Anne Arundel - - 23.994** 26.782 2.151 2.646 
Baltimore City 0.042** 0.047 - - 0.090 0.135 
Baltimore County 0.65 0.505 15.606* 17.786 1.399 1.845 
Montgomery 0.627 0.586 15.038* 17.546 1.348 1.864 
Prince George’s 0.171 0.189 4.093 5.124 0.367 0.556 
Eastern Shore 0.465 0.572 11.153 16.804 - - 
Western MD 1.224 1.314 29.372* 39.646 2.633 3.910 
Southern MD 0.479 0.475 11.492* 13.457 1.030 1.497 
Other Counties 0.121 0.177 2.915 4.345 0.261 0.461 
Offender Score 3.549** 0.583 3.549** 0.583 3.549** 0.583 
Offense Seriousness 1.119 0.466 1.119 0.466 1.119 0.466 
Female 0.618 0.35 0.618 0.35 0.618 0.350 
Black 1.38 0.715 1.38 0.715 1.380 0.715 
Age (years) 1.324 0.242 1.324 0.242 1.324 0.242 
Age2  0.997 0.002 0.997 0.002 0.997 0.002 
Private Attorney 2.734† 1.604 2.734† 1.604 2.734† 1.604 
>1 Count 0.124* 0.105 0.124* 0.105 0.124* 0.105 
MAGS case 0.027 0.079 0.027 0.079 0.027 0.079 
Fiscal Year 1.181* 0.087 1.181* 0.087 1.181* 0.087 
NonABA Plea 0.345 0.255 0.345 0.255 0.345 0.255 
Plea, No Agreement 0.232 0.212 0.232 0.212 0.232 0.212 
Plea, Type Unknown 0.337 0.314 0.337 0.314 0.337 0.314 
Any Trial 0.064† 0.097 0.064† 0.097 0.064† 0.097 
Constant 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 6a: Logistic Regression of ABA Pleas, Relative to Non-ABA Pleas 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
 Odds Ratio (SE) Odds Ratio (SE) Odds Ratio (SE) Odds Ratio (SE) 
Baltimore City 76.467** (48.952) 77.509** (51.513) 128.079** (92.982) 253.207** (210.12) 
Baltimore County 1.000 (0.741) 0.979 (0.740) 0.986 (0.762) 0.818 (0.643) 
Montgomery 16.074** (8.415) 16.869** (9.195) 15.733** (9.257) 33.239** (23.197) 
Prince George’s 82.667** (71.367) 85.177** (73.940) 108.963** (99.814) 101.260** (93.825) 
Eastern Shore 1.722 (1.507) 1.597 (1.411) 0.964 (0.917) 1.029 (1.030) 
Western MD 2.583 (2.000) 2.637 (2.077) 3.131 (2.587) 3.288 (2.867) 
Southern MD 16.238** (10.48) 16.314** (10.644) 18.246** (12.605) 21.402** (15.404) 
Other Counties 18.083** (13.720) 18.893** (14.455) 24.479** (20.933) 29.617** (26.833) 
Offender Score   1.073 (0.096) 1.044 (0.101) 1.107 (0.113) 
Offense Seriousness   0.957 (0.257) 0.887 (0.248) 0.942 (0.271) 
Female     0.441* (0.168) 0.495† (0.203) 
Black     0.414* (0.168) 0.404* (0.175) 
Age (years)     1.125 (0.109) 1.076 (0.102) 
Age2      0.999 (0.001) 0.999 (0.001) 
Private Attorney       1.817 (0.852) 
>1 Count       0.246* (0.135) 
MAGS case       0.147* (0.134) 
Fiscal Year       0.973 (0.054) 
Constant 0.097 0.041 0.099 0.076 0.019 0.042 0.029 (0.069) 
     
Observations 266 266 263 260 
     




Table 6b: Varying the Reference Category in Model 4 of Table 6a (N=260) 
 Reference=Anne Arundel  Reference=Baltimore City   Reference=Eastern Shore 
  †p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01 Odds Ratio SE Odds Ratio SE Odds Ratio SE 
Anne Arundel - - 0.004** 0.003 0.972 0.974 
Baltimore City 253.207** 210.12 - - 246.113** 290.779 
Baltimore County 0.818 0.643 0.003** 0.003 0.795 0.875 
Montgomery 33.239** 23.197 0.131* 0.106 32.308** 34.348 
Prince George’s 101.260** 93.825 0.4 0.389 98.423** 123.194 
Eastern Shore 1.029 1.03 0.004** 0.005 - - 
Western MD 3.288 2.867 0.013** 0.013 3.195 3.773 
Southern MD 21.402** 15.404 0.085** 0.068 20.802** 23.136 
Other Counties 29.617** 26.833 0.117* 0.115 28.788** 35.182 
Offender Score 1.107 0.113 1.107 0.113 1.107 0.113 
Offense Seriousness 0.942 0.271 0.942 0.271 0.942 0.271 
Female 0.495† 0.203 0.495† 0.203 0.495† 0.203 
Black 0.404* 0.175 0.404* 0.175 0.404* 0.175 
Age (years) 1.076 0.102 1.076 0.102 1.076 0.102 
Age2  0.999 0.001 0.999 0.001 0.999 0.001 
Private Attorney 1.817 0.852 1.817 0.852 1.817 0.852 
>1 Count 0.246* 0.135 0.246* 0.135 0.246* 0.135 
MAGS case 0.147* 0.134 0.147* 0.134 0.147* 0.134 
Fiscal Year 0.973 0.054 0.973 0.054 0.973 0.054 
Constant 0.029 0.069 7.411 18.357 0.03 0.069 
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Table 7: Summary of Results 
Prediction Placement Downward Departures ABA Pleas 
Outcomes for white-
collar defendants vary 
by county 





Partially supported, but 
mostly unsupported Supported N/A 
Courts that sentence 
white-collar defendants 
less severely are more 
likely to reach ABA 
plea agreements 
N/A N/A 
Not supported for 
downward departures; 
partially supported for 
placement, but not 











































































Appendix I: Maryland Sentencing Guidelines Offense Table Excerpt 












80  Commercial Fraud, Other  
False statement or false entry in 
records with the intent to deceive a 
person authorized to examine the 
affairs of the bank, trust company, 
or savings bank 
FI, § 5-
803(b)  
Felony  10Y   Property  V  $5,000 
81  Commercial Fraud, Other  
Misappropriation, fraudulent 
conversion, or any fraudulent act in 
the course of engaging in the 
mortgage lending business  
FI, § 11-
523(c)  
Felony  15Y   Property  V  $100,000 
82  Commercial Fraud, Other  
Fraudulent Insurance Acts—
Violation of § 27-407 or any other 
provision of §§ 27-403, 27-404, 27-
405, 27-406, 27-406.1, 27-407, 27-
407.1, or 27-407.2 where the value 




Felony  15Y   Property  V  $10,000 
82-1  Commercial Fraud, Other  
Fraudulent Insurance Acts—
Violation of § 27-407 or any other 
provision of §§ 27-403, 27-404, 27-
405, 27-406, 27-406.1, 27-407, 27-
407.1, or 27-407.2 where the value 




Misd.  18M   Property  VII  $10,000 
83  Commercial Fraud, Other  
Fail to obtain and maintain a 
corporate surety bond or 
irrevocable letter of credit or to 




Felony  15Y   Property  V  $10,000 
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84  Commercial Fraud, Other  
Sales of property, Custom Home 
Protection Act-willful failure to 
obtain and maintain a corporate 
surety bond or to hold sums of 
money in escrow account; willful 
failure to make disclosure; willful 
commission of a breach of trust 
provided in § 10-502  
RP, § 10-
507(b)(2)  
Felony  15Y   Property  V  $10,000 
84-1 Commercial Fraud, Other  
Sales of property, Custom Home 
Protection Act—any other conduct 
that fails to comply with RP, Title 
10, Subtitle 5  
RP, § 10-
507(b)(3) 
Misd. 1Y  Property VII $1,000 
84-5 Commercial Fraud, Other  
Failure of foreclosure consultant to 
obtain a real estate broker's license  
RP, § 7-
318.1(a) 
RP, § 7-321 
(penalty) 
Misd. 3Y  Property  VI  $10,000 
88  Commercial Fraud, Other  
False or misleading statement or 
omission of material fact in sale of 
business opportunity  
BR, § 14-
127(b)  
Felony  5Y   Property  VI  $10,000 
91  Commercial Fraud, Other  
False or misleading statement or 




Felony  5Y   Property  VI  $10,000 




Misd. 1Y  Property VII $500 
99  Consumer Protection Laws  
Violation of Title 14 —
Miscellaneous Consumer 
Protection Provisions, Credit Card 
Number Protection Act  
CR, § 8-216  Felony  15Y   Property  V  $1,000 
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332  Public Health and Safety, 
Crimes Against 
Hazardous substances—storing, 
treating, dumping, etc., in other 
than hazardous substance facility; 
transporting for treatment, storage, 
etc. to any place other than 
hazardous substance facility; 
falsifying required information; 
authorizing, directing, etc., any 
offense listed in this section  
EN, § 7-
265(a) 
Felony  5Y   Person  V  $100,000 
333  Public Health and Safety,  
Crimes Against  
Unlawfully cause or unlawfully 
dump, deposit, throw, etc., litter 
greater than 500 lbs. in weight or 
216 cubic feet in volume or for 
commercial purposes  
CR, § 10-
110(f)(2)(iii)  
Misd.  5Y   Property  VI  $30,000 
335  Public Health and Safety, 
Crimes Against  
Pollutants—dispersing into State 




Misd.  1Y   Property  VII  $25,000 
387  Theft, Crimes Involving  
Embezzlement, misappropriation 
by fiduciaries  
CR, § 7-113  Misd.  5Y  1Y Property  V   
*In 2014 the Commission recategorized this offense under a newly created category heading for “False 
Advertising and Related Crimes” (COMAR# 145 and 146). The Database extract used includes one person 
sentenced for this offense in 2000, while the Commission categorized it as a form of commercial fraud.
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Appendix II: Robustness Checks 
Robustness checks of the final models in Tables 3a, 4a, 5a, and 6a involved: (a) 
substituting the midpoint of the sentencing guidelines for the offender score and offense 
seriousness category (together the offender score and offense seriousness category 
determine the guidelines recommendation); (b) controlling for all three of the offender 
score, offense seriousness category, and the guidelines midpoint; (c) substituting the 
relationship to the criminal justice system variable (i.e., currently on parole or probation), 
prior adult criminal record score, and prior parole or probation violation variable for the 
offender score (the relationship, adult record, and prior violations variables are three of 
the four components of the offender score—juvenile delinquency is the fourth and is not 
available in these data; (d) controlling for both the offender score and its components; (e) 
substituting the maximum carceral penalty, whether the conviction offense was a felony, 
and dummy variables for crime type category (consumer protection, environmental, or 
embezzlement, with commercial fraud the omitted category) for the offense seriousness 
category—when assigning offense seriousness categories, the MSCCSP considers 
statutory maximum sentences, felony or misdemeanor classification, and substantive 
similarity); (f) controlling for both the offense seriousness category and its 
considerations; (g) using calendar year instead of fiscal year; (h) using dummy variables 
to control for fiscal year instead of a single term; and (i) using dummy variables to 
control for calendar year. (Because of few observations in 1999, (h) and (i) combine 1999 
with 2000.) 
Altering specifications and, in some instances, adding several terms to models 
that already contain numerous variables, and without very large numbers of observations 
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will of course affect results. This is particularly the case where, as here, several of the 
variables have relatively little variation across observations. Nevertheless the results 
under the various robustness checks were generally similar to the models reported in the 
Tables. Substantial differences described below.  
For the any incarceration outcome, the significant geographic variables in Model 
5 of Table 3a were significant in the same direction (i.e., odds ratios greater than one or 
less than one) under the alternate specifications. Magnitudes of the odds ratios varied 
under different specifications, but were for the most part similar. (Specification (d) 
completely determined one success.) 
For the postsentencing placement outcome, Baltimore City was no longer 
significant under (a). Prince George’s County’s was no longer significant under (g), and 
its significance became marginal under (e), (f), and (h). For the other geographic 
variables and under the other robustness checks, the significant geographic variables in 
Model 5 of Table 4a were significant in the same direction under the alternate 
specifications. Magnitudes of the odds ratios varied, but were for the most part similar, 
though some became substantially larger under some specifications. (Specification (d) 
completely determined one success.) 
For the downward departures model the significant geographic variable in Model 
5 of Table 5a was significant in the same direction under the alternate specifications. 
Magnitudes of the odds ratios varied, some substantially, under some specifications. To 
avoid Stata not using observations, (h) combined fiscal years 1999 through 2002, and (i) 
combined calendar years 1999 through 2001 for downward departures. (Specification (a) 
completely determined one success and (i) determined two failures.) 
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Modeling the odds of reaching an ABA plea, relative to a non-ABA plea, results 
were generally similar under most of the robustness checks with respect to geographical 
variables significance, direction, and general magnitude. In specifications (e), (h), and (i) 
the odds ratios for some of the terms became much larger. For the other geographic 
variables and under the other robustness checks, the significant geographic variables in 
Model 4 of Table 8 were significant and in the same direction under the alternate 
specifications, though the magnitudes of the odds ratios of course varied somewhat. To 
avoid Stata not using observations, (h) combined fiscal years 1999 through 2001. 
(Specification (e) completely determines two failures and four successes.)  
90 
 
Appendix III: Other Modeling Approaches for Departures and Disposition 
Initially, I attempted to estimate departures using ordinal logit. None of the 
geographical variables were significant. Null results were not sensitive to the 
geographical reference category, to alternate specifications of the offender’s criminal 
justice history and offense seriousness, or to using calendar year instead of fiscal year. 
The only exception was a marginally significant difference for Prince George’s County 
compared to Anne Arundel County when using dummy variables to control for the fiscal 
year of sentence (but not calendar year). Given the overall robustness of the null results 
and large number of tests conducted, this seemed likely to have been a Type I error. 
Because the ordinal logit model depends on the questionable proportional odds 
assumption, I also estimated departures with multinomial logit. Baltimore City had 
marginally lower log odds of a downward departure, compared to a within guidelines 
sentence, relative to Anne Arundel County when controlling for the offender’s criminal 
justice history, offense seriousness, demographic characteristics, and case processing 
variables. With controls for disposition type, both Baltimore City and Prince George’s 
County had significantly lower log odds of a downward departure (Prince George’s 
County marginally so), and Baltimore City also had marginally lower log odds of an 
upward departure, compared to a within guidelines sentence, relative to Anne Arundel 
County. But controlling for disposition type completely determined three observations, 
resulting in questionable standard errors.  
Results of the multinomial logistic regression for departures were furthermore not 
very robust. Alternate specifications of the multinomial logit model of departures 
generated differences with respect to significance, direction, or both, when controlling for 
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disposition type. And because each of these alternate specifications involved three to five 
completely determined observations, all the results were questionable. Other differences 
eventuated using multinomial logit to model departures without controlling for 
disposition. 
Prior research has shown inconsistent and sometimes counterintuitive effects of 
type of disposition, e.g., King, Soulé, Steen, and Weidner, 2005. Because of that prior 
research, the current study first attempted to use a multinomial (as opposed to ordinal or 
binary) logit model of disposition type. Using multinomial logit to estimate geographical 
effects on seven outcome categories (five if combining all trial types) while varying 
geographical reference categories quickly became extremely unwieldy, with meaningful 
interpretations cumbersome and broader assessments of the effect of location on 
disposition (beyond particular outcome a compared to base outcome b for County C 
relative to County D) impracticable.  
Because of null, fragile, and unhelpful results with the more complicated ordinal 
and multinomial logit models (available upon request), I ultimately used binary logit for 
downward departures and for ABA plea agreements (ABA pleas were the dispositional 
outcome with the greatest theoretical interest). The latter was limited to defendants with a 
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